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Executive Summary
Introduction
In the Assembly of Seven Generations’ report, Accountability in Our Lifetime: A Call to Honour
the Rights of Indigenous Children and Youth, Indigenous youth stated clearly:
Indigenous youth and children need action and it is urgent. [...] [The human rights
violations experienced by Indigenous children and youth] is beyond the point of
advocacy, rights promotion and the power to report. There must be accountability for
those in positions of power that demonstrate prejudice and racism towards Indigenous
peoples as well as accountability for the decades of broken promises on behalf of
Canadian governments. The bleak reality is that government inaction and its ongoing
violations of the rights of Indigenous youth and children has resulted in harms.
Accountability and advocacy mechanisms can address and prevent violations of rights to
substantive equality and resulting harms. They have an important role in ensuring,
strengthening and promoting good governance in democratic countries world-wide. To date,
existing accountability mechanisms in Canada have not generally served the accountability
needs of Indigenous children and families. Numerous reports and inquiries have identified this
unmet need, including the Auditor General of Canada, the TRC Final Report and the MMIWG
National Inquiry Final Report. The Canadian Human Rights Tribunal (“CHRT”)’s 2016 Caring
Society case was a watershed decision in holding Canada accountable for systemic
underfunding of child welfare and other essential services. However, this was a hard-won
victory and much work remains to rectify systemic inequities and discrimination.
In the summer of 2020, the Caring Society, acting jointly with the Department of Indigenous
Services Canada (ISC), approached the authors to undertake research on the design of an
independent accountability mechanism to oversee the government’s adherence with the
numerous orders that have been made by the CHRT based on Jordan’s Principle and
substantive equality in Caring Society et al. v Canada. The intended outcome of our research
was this report, setting out at least three potential, well-research options “for an effective
national Jordan’s Principle Ombuds-like function.”
There is a wide breadth of general or specialized accountability mechanisms encompassed
within the broad concept of “Ombuds.” Their common elements are independence and the
ability to investigate and address concerns relating to government action outside of the formal
court system. Ombuds-like institutions may be referred to as Ombuds, Advocates or
Commissioners, and may or may not be connected to a quasi-judicial process like a tribunal.
More detailed information can be found in the section, “Primer on Accountability Mechanisms” of
this report. Looking at the variety of models available, our objective, and the focus of this report,
most simply, is to propose accountability institutions and measures to meaningfully address the
discrimination identified by the CHRT in Caring Society and effectively prevent similar practices
in the future.
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In Part 1 of this report, we attempt to summarize the long history that forms the context of the
need for independent accountability measures to meaningfully address the discrimination
identified by the CHRT in Caring Society and prevent similar practices in the future. Drawing
from this context, in Part 2, we set out what we identify as 10 key accountability needs of
Indigenous children and families that must be addressed in order to provide effective
accountability. Finally, in Part 3, we discuss features of effective accountability mechanisms
and propose three interconnected mechanisms that we believe address the accountability
needs. Any of these three mechanisms, individually, would serve to provide greater protection of
the rights of Indigenous children and families from the discrimination found in the Caring Society
case by improving government accountability. However, as outlined in this report, none are
sufficient, on their own, to address all of the identified accountability needs. Therefore, we reach
the conclusion that combining all three mechanisms would be the most effective way of
preventing discrimination from continuing or re-emerging in the future.
These 3 Parts are summarized in this Executive Summary and discussed in greater detail in the
body of this report.
Part 1: Context: The Need for an Independent Accountability Mechanism
Professor Linda Reif, an expert on international human rights and ombuds institutions, reminded
us that the driving question in designing any accountability mechanism should be, “What are the
real accountability problems we want to address?” Therefore we begin by reviewing the historic
and continuing accountability problems that form the present context.
Over-representation: Governments in Canada have contributed to taking away thousands of
Indigenous children from their families and communities. This started with the federal residential
school system, through the so-called “sixties-scoop” and continues in the extreme overrepresentation of First Nation children in provincial child welfare systems today. In the last 70
years, the inadequate provision of services to meet the needs of Indigenous children living with
their families has significantly contributed to this gross over-representation.
Interjurisdictional Neglect: Inequitable service provision is rooted in the “jurisdictional
wrangling” between provincial and federal governments, to avoid funding these services. In its
2019 Final Report, the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls
named this problem “interjurisdictional neglect.” This interjurisdictional neglect widens the gap
between Indigenous children and families and other children and families in Canada.
Findings of Inequitable Funding and Inadequate Reforms: The TRC Final Report
documented Canada’s refusal to adequately fund health services as a cause of high illness and
death rates of Indigenous children in residential schools. There has been documented
underfunding of essential services on reserve for decades, culminating in the CHRT First Nation
Caring Society decision in 2016. First Nations began voicing concerns in the 1970s and 1980s.
Canada developed the FNCFS program to address concerns, but in 2000 and 2005, the
Assembly of First Nations [AFN] and Canada commissioned expert reports which confirmed the
5
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systemic underfunding continued in the FNCFS program. Canada did little to implement the
reports’ recommendations. The Caring Society and the AFN finally filed a human rights
complaint with the Canadian Human Rights Commission in 2007. Years of procedural
arguments and delays followed.
The Caring Society Case: In 2016, the Tribunal ordered in favour of the complainants. It found
that discrimination on race and/or national ethnic origin was made out. In extensive reasons, the
Tribunal highlighted the real power and control Canada held over child welfare services on
reserve. Funding formulas did not ensure culturally appropriate programming, were not
comparable to provincial funding to meet provincial standards, and, in fact, led to perverse
incentives to remove First Nations from their homes as a ‘first resort’ rather than a last one. The
Tribunal also found that Canada had wrongly adopted a very narrow interpretation of Jordan’s
Principle, continuing to leave many First Nation children behind. Canada committed to not
appeal this case and to make reforms to address its findings.
Non-compliance Orders and Inadequate Reforms: Since the main Caring Society decision,
the Tribunal has found several instances of non-compliance by Canada, particularly its failure to
implement a broad interpretation of Jordan’s Principle and an effective process to respond to
Jordan’s Principle requests and appeals. The non-compliance decisions highlight numerous
systemic and accountability issues, including following old approaches (comparability instead of
substantive equality) and a too narrow definition of services and children covered by Jordan’s
principle, as well as using funding authorities to justify inaction, failure to collect appropriate data
to properly assess Jordan’s Principle requests and needs, and lack of an arms-length appeal
process.
While some real reforms have been made, they remain inadequate. The Department of
Indigenous Services [ISC] has attempted to respond to the CHRT rulings through internal
measures, such as educating ISC staff, modifying some processes, funding community services
coordinators to help applicants, and changing its Jordan’s Principle’s appeal process. However,
meaningful internal change is challenging. There is high staff turnover, and the modified appeal
process was stalled due to vacancies.
Individualization of Claims and ‘Projectification’: The Jordan’s Principle application process
remains individualized and onerous for applicants. In particular, requiring all applicants to
provide documentary evidence and demonstrate how a request aligns with substantive equality
is burdensome, and leads, unsurprisingly, to high numbers of requests being assessed as
submitted without sufficient information (51% of all Jordan’s Principle requests in 2019-2020),
rather than granted or denied on their merits. This issue is part of a larger concern of
“projectification”, described in Sinha et al, 2021 - that ISC’s view of Jordan’s Principle appears
to be akin to a program. The current process is individualistic case by case, demand-driven and
contingent on the capacity of applicants to successfully navigate it. Systemic assessment and
development of proactive policies and practices to ensure equitable services is still missing.
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Canada has increased funding for FNCFS services through annual budget allocations, but has
also resisted reforming its funding approach to the FNCFS Program to one that is needs-based,
and informed by principles of self-government. Details of long-term reform in relation to funding
have yet to be released by Canada.
Statutory Reforms with Inadequate Education, Resources or Oversight for Compliance:
Canada passed An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, SC
2019, c 24 (“C92”), which sets out national minimum standards and recognizes an inherent
Indigenous right to self government, including child and family services. C92 legislates Jordan’s
Principle in s. 9(3)(e):
in order to promote substantive equality between Indigenous children and other children,
a jurisdictional dispute must not result in a gap in the child and family services that are
provided in relation to Indigenous children.
However, Canada has provided little to no education or resources to support understanding and
implementation of C92. C92 does not specify how s. 9(3)(e) will be ensured, or whether Canada
or the provinces bear responsibility for funding services to achieve the national minimum
standards or Indigenous self government. There are mixed messages regarding so-called
“coordination agreements” between First Nations, provinces and Canada for the self
government aspect. It is unclear how, without more, C92 responds to the tribunal rulings, and
there are fears it may perpetuate, or even escalate, the jurisdictional wrangling in this area.
ISC standards within Department of Indigenous Services Act, SC 2019, c 29, s 336 (“DISA”),
which came into effect in July 2019, provides further grounding to respond to the tribunal
rulings. The preamble includes commitments to ensure service standards are transparent and
meet the needs of Indigenous groups, recognize socio-economic gaps, promote Indigenous
ways of being and doing, and that ISC collaborate and cooperate with Indigenous peoples.
DISA identifies the group ISC serves as “Indigenous peoples”, which includes “Indian, Inuit and
Metis peoples.” In s. 6(2) it states the minister “shall” ensure a range of services, including child
and family services, education and health, and in s. 7(2) it requires collaboration in the
development, provision, assessment and improvement of the services listed at s. 6(2). Further,
the DISA commits Canada to implementing the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous, as does Canada’s 2021 law, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples Act, SC 2021, c 14 (“UNDRIPA”), which affirms the Declaration as a
universal human rights instrument with application to Canadian law.
C92, DISA, the Declaration and UNDRIPA provide solid statutory support for transparent,
equitable needs-based and cooperative service provision. However, it is not clear to what extent
DISA or UNDRIPA are being followed by the Department at this time. There is potential and a
need for education and oversight of ISC regarding compliance and implementation.
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Ongoing Gaps of Education, Advocacy and Accountability:
Lack of awareness and education by both governmental and non-governmental professionals
continues to present significant challenges to the effective implementation of Jordan’s Principle
and equitable culturally appropriate services for Indigenous children and families. Generally,
both the MMIWG Final Report (2019) and the TRC Final Report (2016) called for national
advocates in this area. Provincial governments continue to deny responsibility for services to
First Nation children and families. According to Jordan’s Principle Operational Committee
respondents to a survey in early 2021, specific challenges to implementing Jordan’s Principle
continue to include informational limits to written documentation, interpretation of reviewers or
failure to follow parameters causing claims being denied in error, lack of reasons for denials,
barriers to appeals due to burdensome document requirements, requiring individuals or First
Nations to demonstrate how substantive equality applies, timelines and delays, lack of
information and communication, lack of aging out of care supports, high turnover of ISC staff,
worker burnout, lack of expertise in substantive equality, and failure of provincial governments
to come to the table. Respondents identified the need for more internal training and community
educational outreach as well as quicker and easier access to services.
Currently, there is some support to address some of these challenges through government
funded Jordan’s Principle Navigators and Regional Focal Points. However, the Caring Society,
a small fundraising reliant charity with no government funding, continues to play a crucial
advocacy role in supporting families in seeking to access Jordan’s Principle and substantive
equality, including drawing on its network of lawyers who assist on a pro bono basis to address
denials, from liaising with ISC to filing judicial reviews. The Caring Society also informally
provides oversight of ISC’s implementation of the CHRT decisions, by bringing issues of noncompliance to the CHRT’s attention, as well as continuing to publicly raise awareness of
systemic discrimination against First Nations children and families. ISC staff are uncertain as to
what they can share with the Caring Society advocates due to privacy and confidentiality. The
Society’s staff recognize that they cannot help all who need assistance and emphasize the need
for formalized and funded advocacy services for First Nations children and families.
Part 2: Accountability Needs:
The preceding discussion demonstrates 10 major accountability needs relating to Jordan’s
Principle, and equitable services for Indigenous children, families and communities:
1. Oversight of the current Jordan's Principle process at ISC: While ISC staff may be
well intentioned and committed to implementation, deep systemic inequality and the
legacy of discrimination requires oversight from a body with relevant expertise.
2. Oversight of ISC’s long-term reform of CFS, including funding of agencies, as well
as CIRNAC’s funding and negotiation of self-government under C92: Long term
reform was a key order of the Main Decision and oversight is required to address the
current lack of transparency, education and resources for understanding and
implementation and funding of self government in relation to child and family services.
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3. Oversight of Canada’s efforts addressing systemic inequality in services related
to Indigenous children and families: Eliminating systemic inequality in delivery of
essential services is the ultimate goal of Jordan’s Principle, the Main Decision, and a
core recommendation in numerous reports and inquiries, including the TRC and MMIWG
National Inquiry Final Reports.
4. Oversight of federal-provincial efforts at cooperation in relation to funding and
servicing of Indigenous children and families: Ending interjurisdictional neglect
requires oversight of federal-provincial cooperation and compliance with Jordan’s
Principle and C92 responsibilities to Indigenous children, families and communities.
5. Ongoing education to ISC, CIRNA, provincial DCS staff, provincial agencies,
Social workers, Crown lawyers, legal aid lawyers, judges: Effective implementation
of the CHRT Orders, Jordan’s Principle and C92 requires more and ongoing education
for all government and legal actors responsible for compliance and application.
6. Investigating and mediating individual complaints about provincial governments
funding failure to provide services to Indigenous children and families: This is
necessary as many provincial child advocates, ombuds and legal services providers
aren’t aware of or pursuing Indigenous children and families’ rights.
7. Investigating and mediating individual complaints about child welfare agencies’
implementation of CFS laws and policies, including C92: Several inquiries, including
the MMIWG National Inquiry, called for an Indigenous-specific child advocate, as there is
inconsistency with provincial child advocates ensuring compliance with provincial
statutory protections, and now the C92 minimum standards.
8. Powers for enforceable orders against Canada for non-compliance with Jordan’s
Principle, substantive equality and other relevant laws and international
requirements (C-92, DISA, UNDRIP, CRC, etc): Supervisory jurisdiction has been key
to the CHRT’s ability to affect change in the Caring Society and something similar to
take its place is necessary for when the Tribunal is no longer seized of the case, given
the extraordinary long history and seriousness of substantive equality and statutory
human rights violations, and Canada’s intransigence to change even after the Main
Decision.
9. Powers for enforceable orders against provinces for non-compliance with
Jordan’s Principle, substantive equality against provinces and relevant laws and
international requirements (C-92, UNDRIP, CRC, etc): The history of provincial
neglect of Indigenous children and families’ needs justifies having a body that can also
grant binding orders against the provinces for their failure to respect their obligations.
10. Legal advocacy for First Nations children, families and communities for
government services and in child welfare matters: It is evident there continues to be
a strong, largely unmet need for formal, funded advocacy to support Indigenous children

9
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and families vis-a-vis both federal and provincial governments in relation to the provision
of equitable services and child and family services matters.
Part 3: Features of Effective Accountability Mechanisms and Recommendations:
Based on research into provincial, national and international ombud-like and other accountability
mechanisms to address substantive equality and statutory human rights concerns, including the
importance of accountability mechanisms being context driven, so impacted by the history and
needs discussed above, we have identified the following five features of effective accountability:
A. External accountability mechanisms: Currently, there are no external non-judicial
accountability mechanisms that apply to the work of ISC and CIRNAC.
B. Legislated mechanisms, not simply created by the executive: For effective
independence from the government of the day, legislatures, and not executives, ought to
create accountability bodies, appoint their leadership, oversee the bodies’ functions, and
be the government entity receiving reports from the body.
C. Mechanism with specific mandates relating to Indigenous children and families:
The unparallelled gravity and longevity of the ongoing substantive equality and statutory
human rights violations of Indigenous children and families in Canada requires the
creation of mechanisms with specific mandates in relation to Indigenous children and
families.
D. Mechanisms with powers over all Indigenous children: As per SCC jurisprudence,
DISA and C92, federal jurisdiction applies to First Nations, both status and non-status,
Metis and Inuit peoples. Powers over all Indigenous children is necessary for any
mechanism to reduce, not reproduce, exclusion or jurisdictional neglect. Such an
inclusive approach is not the same thing as a pan-Indigenous approach. It is equally
important that the mechanisms recognize the diverse legal traditions among Indigenous
peoples.
E. Mechanisms that bypass jurisdictional wrangling: Currently, neither human rights
bodies nor the courts in Canada can hear a complaint of denial of services involving both
the federal and provincial government at the same time. Ironically, and tragically, as
lawyer David Taylor puts it, there appears to be a Jordan’s Principle problem in
vindicating Jordan’ Principle claims. For an accountability mechanism to be effective, it
must challenge the conventional jurisdictional boundaries that could lead to delays and
denials of services under it, and have led to the decades of interjurisdictional neglect of
Indigenous children and families. Canada has the power to do this under s. 91(24).

Recommendations:
Based on the accountability needs identified in Part 2, and the features of effective human
rights accountability mechanisms identified in this Part, we recommend 3 interconnected
mechanisms to safeguard the needs of Indigenous children and families. While originally
we expected to propose 3 independent options, we have come to the conclusion that, while any
of the three mechanisms, on their own, would be an improvement over the status quo, all 3 are
necessary to achieve meaningful accountability. The stakes are too high, the pattern of
10
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discrimination too long and entrenched, and Canada’s practice, policy and even legal reforms
still too inadequate, for anything less to actually be effective at this point.
The 3 accountability mechanisms are:
1. A National Indigenous Child and Family Advocate: This would be a primarily based
on the model a child advocate ombuds model, but also with specific jurisdiction to
oversee governments’ delivery of services to Indigenous children and families in
accordance with Jordan’s Principle, their right to substantive equality in statutory human
rights instruments and other relevant laws and international requirements (C-92, DISA,
UNDRIP, CRC, etc). The Advocate would also oversee governments’ implementation of
child welfare legislation and policy in relation to Indigenous children and families. In this
regard, in addition to addressing systemic issues, the Advocate would assist Indigenous
children and families resolve individual complaints through informal and confidential
means.
2. A National Indigenous Child and Family Tribunal: This would have the power to hear
complaints from individuals, groups, communities or the Child Advocate. Complaints
would include those of a systemic nature against the federal or provincial governments
and their delegates in relation to Jordan’s Principle, substantive equality and the
implementation of CFS laws and policies, including C92. The Tribunal should have
robust remedial powers to effectively uphold the right to substantive equality and other
statutory human rights of Indigenous children and families.
3. National Legal Services for Indigenous Children and Families: This would be
designed to provide Indigenous children and families with state-funded access to
knowledgeable lawyers who can support them in their attempts to access substantive
equality in essential services from federal and provincial governments, and in their
interactions with child welfare systems. The power imbalance between individual
children and families and the state makes advocacy essential for upholding the right to
substantive equality and other statutory human rights.
We conclude that all 3 of these mechanisms are necessary to effectively address the
government conduct that has contributed to the harm Indigenous youth name, including the
overrepresentation of Indigenous children in state care and the senseless suffering and
separation of Indigenous children and families with medical and disability needs, for decades.

All 3 of these mechanisms must, at minimum, have the following features for effectivity:
● Be set out in federal legislation and not simply created by the executive, in order to
ensure independence from government and the greatest degree of oversight and
accountability;
● Be specific to the interest and rights of Indigenous children and families (and not
wrapped into to broader mechanisms);
● Apply to all Indigenous children and families, not just First Nations on reserve (e.g., nonstatus First Nations, off-reserve, Métis and Inuit) while recognizing distinctions based on
local needs and diverse legal traditions among Indigenous peoples; and
11
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●

Apply to conduct of both federal and provincial governments, which Canada has the
constitutional jurisdiction to legislate pursuant to s 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1982.

We believe all three mechanisms we have outlined can and should be legislated within one
federal statute. The following chart sets out the three accountability mechanisms, with reference
to the accountability needs each would address as well as essential elements for efficacy.
Accountability Mechanism 1: National Indigenous Child and Family Advocate

National Indigenous Child and Family Advocate
Accountability needs
to be addressed:
Need #1: Oversight of
Canada’s
implementation of
Jordan’s Principle
Need #2: Oversight of
Canada’s long-term
reform of child welfare,
including C92
implementation
Need #3: Oversight
Canada’s
implementation of
substantive equality in
relation to all services
impacting on
Indigenous Children
and Families
Need #4: Oversight of
Federal-Provincial
cooperation in servicing
Indigenous Children
and Families
Need #5: Ongoing
education for federal
and provincial
government actors
involved in child welfare
services
Need #6: Oversight of
provincial governments’

To be effective this Advocate should:

a. Assess governments’ obligations in relation to Jordan’s
Principle and substantive equality (protected under each
government’s human rights legislation and the Charter), C-92
and international instruments such as United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the
Conventions with Rights of the Child, and the Convention of
Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
b. Scrutinizes governments’ distinctions-based approach in
relation to the need for equitable services on the grounds of
the various subcategories of Indigeneity governments have
relied on in the past to make distinctions (non-status, offreserve, Metis, Inuit, etc.) as prima facie discrimination.
c. Have the power to investigate individual, group and community
complaints, as well as institute own-motion investigations,
including into systemic issues.
d. Have robust investigative powers to collect and compel
necessary information from government parties to effectively
respond to the different types of complaints as well as to be
able to effectively conduct systemic oversight.
e. Conduct research and hire experts in conducting systemic
inquiries.
f.

Be mandated to meet with children and youth and ensure their
voices are heard in the work of the Advocate’s Office.

g. Attempt to facilitate resolution of complaints through informal
and confidential means. Such methods for resolving disputes
should draw on Indigenous laws and the dispute resolution
processes where possible. This would not prevent reporting
and recommendations.
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implementation of
substantive equality in
relation to all services
impacting on
Indigenous Children
and Families
Need #7: Oversight of
child provincial welfare
agencies, including
their implementation of
C92

h. Providing a “one stop shop” that can support Indigenous
children, youth and their families in navigating the different
accountability mechanisms that exist. This is not intended to
limit peoples’ options for resolving complaints through other
mechanisms. It is our hope that an individual or group might
start with the Advocate to seek informal resolution or, at the
least, obtain information to navigate their options, and possibly
be connected with legal support if necessary (we explain this
further below with our third mechanism, National Legal
Services for Indigenous Children and Families).
i.

Have the power to make recommendations to governments,
and to escalate these recommendations to higher levels (up to
and including the Tribunal) if recommendations are not
reasonably acted upon.

j.

Report annually to Parliament on its activities, as well as make
special reports commenting on any matter within the scope of
its powers that it deems appropriate.

k. Intervene in any adjudicative proceedings relating to the
jurisdiction of the Advocate.
l.

Educate the public and federal and provincial civil servants,
and those involved in child welfare matters, about the right to
substantive equality and Jordan’s Principle, of Indigenous
children and families, as well as their rights within child welfare
matters, including under C92.

m. Play a ‘knowledge mobilization’ role in terms of ensuring that
standards and practices are consistently applied/understood
throughout the various jurisdiction and country, and act as a
resource for Indigenous nations and communities to facilitate
learning from each other.
n. Promote connections to culture, families, lands, waters,
language, songs and stories, as well as encourage the
implementation of Indigenous laws in the work of the Advocate.
Beyond these requirements, further details about the Advocate
(composition, qualifications, terms, staff, etc.) ought to be
determined in discussion and cooperation with Indigenous groups,
including Indigenous children and youth, the Caring Society and the
pro bono lawyers who have been supporting it. We further suggest
that, in the actual development of the enabling legislation, further
expert advice be sought to recommend specific statutory language.
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Accountability Mechanism 2: National Indigenous Child and Family Tribunal

National Indigenous Child and Family Tribunal
Accountability needs
to be addressed:
Need #8: Enforce
orders against Canada
for non-compliance
with Jordan’s Principle,
substantive equality
and other relevant laws
and international
requirements (C-92,
DISA, UNDRIP, CRC,
etc)
Need #9: Enforce
orders against
provinces for noncompliance with
Jordan’s Principle,
substantive equality
against provinces and
relevant laws and
international
requirements (C-92,
UNDRIP, CRC, etc)

To be effective this Tribunal should:

a. Have the power to issue binding orders against both the federal
and provincial governments and their public servants and
agencies.
b. Have the powers to craft its own procedures and rules of
evidence that are more flexible than the courts, including childinformed and child-friendly procedures, and the incorporation of
Indigenous law and legal procedures into the process.
c. Be mandated to issue remedial orders where discrimination is
established.
d. Have extensive remedial powers, including powers to grant
interim orders and make summary decisions, as well as the
power to exercise supervisory jurisdiction made explicit.
e. Be composed of adjudicators with expertise in the
discrimination issues faced by Indigenous children and families.
Beyond these requirements, further details about the Tribunal
(composition, qualifications, terms, staff, etc.) ought to be
determined in discussion and cooperation with Indigenous groups,
including Indigenous children and youth, including parties and
lawyers that have been involved in the Caring Society case.
The creation of a Tribunal with a focus on Indigenous child and
family issues is critical to support the work of the proposed
Advocate. Should Canada eventually implement
recommendations from the MMWIG National Inquiry and others to
create a National Indigenous and Human Rights Tribunal, we think
this body could equally support the work of the Advocate, so long
as the Tribunal is focused only on Indigenous matters, can bind
both the provinces and governments, and has a sufficiently flexible
process and robust remedies. However, until such time as a
National Indigenous and Human Rights Tribunal, there needs to be
a National Indigenous Child and Family Tribunal.
Finally, to ensure the utmost independence from the federal
government, the proposed Tribunal should not be included within
the schedule of federal administrative tribunals falling under the
Administrative Tribunals and Support Services of Canada Act, SC
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2014, c 20, s 36.

Mechanism 3: National Legal Services for Indigenous Children and Families

National Legal Services for Indigenous Children and Families
Accountability needs
to be addressed:
Need #10: Formal
advocacy for First
Nations children,
families and
communities for
government services
and in child welfare
matters

To be effective the National Legal Services should:

a. Include funding support from filling forms, letter writings and
speaking on their behalf, to pursuing existing Ombuds, Child
Advocate, human rights processes (before the federal or
provincial human rights commission, or the new Tribunal we
are proposing) or judicial review in the courts.
b. Take the form of a legal referral service housed in the proposed
Advocate (similar to the Legal Representation for Child and
Youth branch of Alberta’s Office of the Child and Youth
Advocate). This includes:
i.

The Advocate’s Office has the power to refer children and
families to lawyers and appoint lawyers to represent them to
access substantive equality in services from the federal and
provincial governments, and in their interactions with child
welfare systems.

ii.

The lawyers appointed would be from a roster maintained by
the Advocate. To get on the roster, lawyers would have to
meet standards and expectations set by Advocate (e.g.,
practice experience, years at the bar of a province,
knowledge of Indigenous communities, etc.).

Conclusion:
In identifying the accountability problems to be addressed by an accountability mechanism for
this report, we have looked thoroughly at the context of “one of the worst possible cases” of
racial discrimination, that has deeply and irrevocably harmed multiple generations of Indigenous
children and families. We have also reviewed features of effective accountability mechanisms
that can contribute to the imperative work of bringing an end to these ongoing harms.
There has been progress, and genuine work toward internal, policy and even legislative reform.
However, there is much work to be done and many of the reforms that Canada has unilaterally
15
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implemented have been inadequate to stymy ongoing substantive equality and other statutory
human rights violations. The vast majority of meaningful reforms to date have occurred since
the Tribunal issued its 2016 Main Decision and retained supervisory jurisdiction.
There will come a day when the Tribunal will relinquish jurisdiction over the case. Given the
very long history of systemic discrimination against Indigenous people by the government in
Canada, particularly in the area of service delivery, it will be important to have alternative
accountability mechanisms in place. We have set out 3 that, together, we believe will practically
address the accountability problems that have facilitated one of the worst possible cases of
racial discrimination in Canadian history for over half a century. There are also internal steps
ISC can take in the interim, and in addition, to external legislated accountability mechanisms,
discussed in Part 3 A and in the Conclusions and Recommendations of this Report.
The Assembly of Seven Generations report clearly emphasized that “Indigenous youth and
children deserve accountability and responsibility from the federal government, as well as all
levels of government.” As Cindy Blackstock says, once we know better, we need to do better.
We hope and believe a new and better chapter has begun and can be created for present and
future generations. Accountability is an essential aspect of this. Indigenous children, youth and
families deserve nothing less.

16

Doing Better: Jordan’s Principle Accountability Mechanisms Report

Introduction
In the summer of 2020, we were approached by the Caring Society, acting jointly with the
Department of Indigenous Services Canada [ISC], to undertake research on the design of an
independent accountability mechanism to oversee the government’s adherence with the
numerous orders that have been made by the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal based on
Jordan’s Principle and substantive equality in Caring Society et al. v Canada.1 Over the fall of
2020 we developed a workplan for this research, which was signed into a contract for services
with ISC in February 2021.
Our work plan called for the review and analysis of general oversight, accountability and
advocacy mechanisms in Canada and internationally; a review and analysis of Jordan’s
Principle-specific law, policies and processes; and having conversations with key stakeholders2
to help us identify current needs, gaps and promising practices to inform the necessary scope,
function and approach of an accountability mechanism related to Jordan’s Principle and child
welfare. The intended outcome of our research was this report, setting out at least three
potential, well-researched options “for an effective national Jordan’s Principle Ombuds-like
function.”
Early into the life of this project, both the Caring Society and ISC were using the specific
language of an “ombudsperson function” on “Jordan’s Principle.” However, as we got deeper
into our research, we determined that use of these phrases were not intended as predetermining what the accountability mechanisms we propose should look like. Speaking with the
Caring Society, ISC staff and others, we realized that there are several different accountability
mechanisms that are encapsulated within the meaning ‘ombuds’, as we explain in our next
section, entitled ‘Primer on Accountability Mechanisms.’ We also concluded that the
accountability needs of Indigenous children and families go beyond Jordan’s Principle because
the principle arises from, and is informed by, the Caring Society et al. v Canada case, what led
to it, and what has happened since the main decision.
According to international human rights expert, Linda Reif, author of Ombuds Institutions, Good
Governance and the International Human Rights System, core elements of good governance
include democratic government, rule of law, accountability, transparency of government, respect

1

First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of Canada et al. v. Attorney General of Canada (for the
Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs Canada), 2016 CHRT 2 [Caring Society 2016].
2
We met with various key stakeholders including First Nations Child and Family Caring Society of
Canada staff; Joint Policy and Operations Committee on Jordan’s Principle; National Advisory Committee
on First Nations Child Welfare; National Advisory Committee on First Nations Child Welfare; Consultation
Committee on First Nations Child Welfare; lawyers involved in Caring Society et al. matter and advancing
Jordan’s Principle cases; and Indigenous Service Canada staff from Jordan’s Principle branches. These
meetings included local Jordan Principle service coordinators; relevant staff and directors from child
welfare agencies, Indigenous health organizations; representatives from Assembly of First Nations (AFN);
and relevant staff from human rights commission. We also presented at a one-day AFN forum on
Jordan’s Principle and spoke with Linda Reif, a leading Canadian expert in accountability mechanisms.
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for human rights and public participation.3 Accountability and advocacy mechanisms have an
important role in ensuring, strengthening and promoting good governance. Reif explains that
“[g]overnment accountability involves establishing “lines or forms of accountability” between the
government and the public which can cross the spectrum from provision of information, through
the application of procedural fairness legal principles, to subjection of government conduct to
adjudicative decisions or prosecution”.4 An important element of the accountability process is a
mechanism’s ability to make decisions about conduct and make determinations to resolve
inappropriate conduct. Answerability and enforcement are important elements of accountability.
Metis legal scholar, Larry Chartrand, explains that “accountability is inherently a reciprocal
relationship. […] In other words, accountability of government actors to the public is seen as
important in promoting ethical, fair and efficient government decision-making.”5
To date, existing accountability mechanisms in Canada have not generally served the
accountability needs of Indigenous children and families. First of all, aside from the courts and
the Canadian Human Rights Commission (CHRC) and Tribunal, there are no other oversight
mechanisms in relation to the federal government’s departments of ISC and Crown-Indigenous
Relations and Northern Affairs Canada. Further, it has been extremely difficult for Indigenous
children and families to use the courts to hold governments accountable in relation to the
funding of essential services.6 The Canadian Human Rights Tribunal’s 2016 Caring Society
case was a watershed decision in holding Canada accountability for systemic underfunding of
child welfare services, however, this was a hard-won victory (over which the battle continues),
and the fact is that the CHRC and Tribunal have significant shortcomings in meeting the various
accountability needs of Indigenous children and families. There are more oversight mechanisms
at the provincial level, such as ombuds and child advocates, but the extent to which they are
able to or have advanced justice for Indigenous children and families is uncertain. In the
Assembly of Seven Generations’ report, Accountability in Our Lifetime: A Call to Honour the
Rights of Indigenous Children and Youth, Indigenous youth acknowledged that
Canada is long overdue in honouring inherent Indigenous rights, as demonstrated by
generations and over 150 years of reports and recommendations that Indigenous
peoples have provided to Canadians. Indigenous youth and children need action and it
is urgent. [...] [The human rights violations experienced by Indigenous children and
youth] is beyond the point of advocacy, rights promotion and the power to report. There
must be accountability for those in positions of power that demonstrate prejudice and
3

Linda C. Reif, Ombuds Institutions, Good Governance and the International Human Rights System, 2nd
rev Ed. (Boston: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2020) at 145.
4
Ibid at 119.
5
Larry N Chartrand “A Section 35 Watchdog: Furthering Accountability of Federal, Provincial and
Territorial Governments to Aboriginal Peoples” Governance, Self-Government and Legal Pluralism
Conference, April 23-24, 2003, Hull, Quebec, at 4.
6
Janna Promislow & Naiomi Metallic, “Realizing Administrative Aboriginal Law” in Colleen M Flood &
Lorne Sossin, eds, Administrative Law in Context, 3rd ed (Emond Publishing: Toronto, 2017) [Promislow
& Metallic] at 104-108; see also Yellowhead Institute, “Looking for Cash Back in the Courts” (2021),
online: https://cashback.yellowheadinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/Cash-Back-Court-CasesYellowhead-Institute-4.2021.pdf.
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racism towards Indigenous peoples as well as accountability for the decades of broken
promises on behalf of Canadian governments. The bleak reality is that government
inaction and its ongoing violations of the rights of Indigenous youth and children has
resulted in harms”.7
We agree with the assessment of the Assembly of Seven Generations of the bleak nature of
Canadian governments’ accountability to Indigenous children and families. In Part 1 of this
report, we attempt to summarize the long history that informs this conclusion. Drawing from this
history, in Part 2, we set out what we identify as 10 separate accountability needs of Indigenous
children and families that must be addressed in order to provide effective accountability. Finally,
in Part 3, we propose three interconnected mechanisms that we believe address these
accountability needs.

Assembly of Seven Generations, “Accountability in Our Lifetime: A Call to Honour the Rights of
indigenous Children and Youth,” (2021) at 16 [Assembly of Seven Generations].
7
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Primer on Accountability Mechanisms
There are various accountability mechanisms in democratic nations. Similar accountability
mechanisms sometimes have different names, despite having similar purposes and functions.
This primer aims to provide some high level definitions of common accountability mechanisms,
grouped according to purpose and function, along with examples.
1. Independent Accountability Institutions
Independent Accountability institutions are institutions that “control the actions of other state
bodies through actions ranging from soft monitoring to hard coercive standards”.8 Accountability
institutions include, but are not limited to, Ombuds. Some also have additional functions
including litigation, intervention, providing, advice, research and education.9 Generally, these
institutions are established to monitor and supervise the actions and activities of governments to
make sure that they are doing their work in a fair, just and transparent way.10 They are designed
to provide citizens with an accessible, impartial, and informal avenue to address problems with
the actions of government.11 Key roles of accountability institutions include improving human
rights protection and promotion when judicial intervention not available or realistic, improving
domestic human rights circumstances; changing the culture and mindset of bureaucracy,
drawing attention to law reform needs; requesting binding decisions through the courts,
reducing poor bureaucratic behaviour through monitoring, improving rule of law and
strengthening good governance.12
In comparison to judicial institutions, these institutions have broad and flexible assessment
criterion for determining violations. This gives them the ability to address a wider range of
violations using a variety of remedies.13
Some examples of Independent Accountability institutions include:
· Auditor generals,
· Anti-corruption bodies,
· Electoral commissions
· Policing oversight institutions,
· Human rights commissions, and
· Ombudspersons.14

8

Reif supra note 3 at 123.
Ibid at 124.
10
Ibid at 23.
11
Chartrand supra note 5 at 16.
12
Reif supra at note 3 at 118, 147, 245.
13
Ibid at 250-251.
14
Chartrand supra note 5 at 5.
9
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2. Ombuds Institutions (General or Classic)
An ombuds is one kind of independent accountability institution that reviews government,
agencies, and other organizations’ actions.15 According to the Forum of Canadian Ombudsman,
an ombuds is an independent and objective institution that reviews government, agencies, and
other organizations’ actions.16 Reif explains the classic ombuds was established to fight
maladministration17 and supervise the actions of the government's administrative activities.18
The office is provided for by constitution or action by legislature and it is headed by an
independent, high level public official responsible to the legislature. Typically, the core powers of
an ombuds are investigations, making recommendations and submitting reports to resolve
problems by securing redress and improving administrative systems and redress.19 Typical
Ombuds functions include complaint handling and resolution, monitoring and reviewing
functions, individual and systemic advocacy.20 A small number have quasi-coercive powers.21
The process is usually confidential, impartial, and neutral.22
Some examples of ombuds institutions in Canada include:
· Provincial and Territorial ombuds institutions,
· National Defence and Canadian Forces Ombudsman,
· Municipal ombuds institutions.23
3. Thematic Ombuds Institutions
The key distinction of a thematic ombuds institution is that they have jurisdiction over a specific
and distinct thematic or specialized area.24 Over the years, the concept of classic ombuds
institutions have expanded and tailored to meet varying needs of local regions including public
and private sectors, international, national and regional levels and crossing several thematic

Michelle LeBaron “Watchdogs and Wise Ones in Winter Lands: The Practice Spectrum of Canadian
Ombudsman” (2008) Forum of Canadian Ombudsman (FCO) Liz Hoffman Ombudsperson Research
Award Paper at 4, 5.
16
Ibid.
17
Reif supra note 3 at 5.
18
Ibid at 23.
19
Mary A Marshall & Linda C. Reif “The Ombudsmen: Maladministration and alternative dispute
resolution” Alberta Law Review, Vol XXXIV No 1 (1995) at p. 218; Ibid at 225.
20
Commissioner for Children and Young People Western Australia, “Oversight of services for children
and young people in Western Australia” (November 2017) Commissioner for Children and Young People
Western Australia, Perth at 9.
21
Reif supra note 3 at 221.
22
Mary Theresa Hunter “Canadian Child and Youth Advocates: A comparative analysis” Doctor of
Philosophy Dissertation, School of Public Administration, University of Victoria, 2017 at 26.
23
“Ombudsman Offices in Canada” (2021) online: Forum of Canadian Ombudsman <
http://www.ombudsmanforum.ca/en/?page_id=176>.
24
Reif supra note 3 at 62.
15
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areas. They require a level of expertise in the relevant area.25 Thematic institutions may overlap
with general accountability institutions and multiple departments may fall within the scope of
thematic institutions depending on the specific focus of the institution.26 Like classic ombuds,
some thematic ombuds institutions have expanded to include additional mandates such as
explicit human rights protection and promotion, functions related to children’s rights,
preventative measures, monitoring abilities,27 and administrative law litigation functions. These
institutions have a range of powers and functions. They are not only complaint-driven, and may
have some decision-making powers and public education mandates. Some institutions have
additional protection powers other than investigations including mediation and court litigation.28
Some adjudicative powers have been given to thematic equality ombuds,29 though these
institutions rarely have coercive remedial powers.30 Some can conduct audits to ensure
compliance with the law in sensitive areas including police conduct, child protection, and
government intrusion on private communications. Some also do administrative audits if it’s in
the public’s best interest.31 Like classic or general ombuds, thematic ombuds institutions
generally monitor their recommendations and will attempt to use persuasion to encourage
implementation.32
Some examples of thematic ombuds institutions in Canada include:
· Commissioner of Official Languages,
· Privacy Commissioner,
· Information Commissioner,
· Federal Correctional Investigator,
· RCMP External Review Committee, and
· Police Complaints Commissioner.
4. Thematic Ombuds Institutions – Children’s Rights Commissioners and Advocates
Independent accountability institutions that focus on Children’s rights are one type of thematic
ombuds institution. These are typically either Commissioners or Advocates. Children’s
Commissioners have been appointed around the world and typically have similar powers and
functions to other thematic ombuds, but in the area of children’s rights.33 Child Advocates

Marshall & Reif, supra note 19 at p. 230; Jo-Ann EC Greene “On-reserve matrimonial real property
following relationship breakdown: a review of tribunal, ombuds and alternative dispute resolution
mechanisms” INAC Paper, May 2003, at 3, 4.
26
Reif supra note 3 at 71.
27
Ibid at 5.
28
Ibid at 221.
29
Ibid at 227, footnote 22.
30
Ibid at 227.
31
Ibid at 230.
32
Ibid at 28.
33
Daniella Bendo “The Role of Canada’s Child and Youth Advocates: A Social Constructionist Approach”
Master of Arts, Child and Youth Studies Thesis for the Faculty of Social Sciences, Brock University,
August 2016, at p. 21.
25
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support children and youth populations through advocacy and other activities.34 An important
difference to highlight from other thematic ombuds institutions is that Advocates may not
necessarily act impartially. Instead Advocates will act to protect the interest of the specific
population they are mandated to protect.35 In Canada, there are provincial and territorial Child
Advocates. Child Advocates require specialized knowledge and experience. Hunter notes that
all Child Advocates in Canada had advanced degrees and levels of experiences from various
backgrounds including social work, legal backgrounds, education, youth services, nursing,
employment, psychology and health administration, and public administration.36 While Child
Advocate functions vary, common functions of nine provincial and two territorial Child Advocate
offices in Canada include providing individual advocacy, examining systemic issues and
systemic advocacy, raising awareness about children’s rights, and giving advice to improve the
provision of services to children.37 Most have a mixture of traditional functions and specialize
solely on rights of children and youth.38
Almost all Child advocate’ mandates in Canada include monitoring compliance and taking extra
steps when the government is not complying with recommendations including reporting to
higher authority.39 Most Canadian child advocates expect governments to respond to their
advice without formal means of holding the government accountable to improve services to
children.40 However, tracking and monitoring compliance were noted as key factors in
influencing change.41
Some examples of Child Advocates in Canada include:
·

The Alberta’s Office of the Child and Youth Advocate: The OCYA is valued for its
ability to identify systemic issues through its relationship and direct input from
children and youth affected. This feedback and other quality assurance processes
help to inform practice and make effective recommendations to improve services.42
The OCYA conducts systemic reviews and advocacy as well as providing individual
advocacy services to children and youth involved in designated services. It may
appoint legal representation for young people in relation to those services.43

·

BC’s Office of the Representative of Children and Youth: In 2005, BC
established a legislative office, the Representative of Children and Youth.44 BC’s

34

Reif supra note 3 at 49-50.
Ibid.
36
Hunter supra note 22 at 63.
37
Ibid at 1, 6, 72.
38
Ibid. Note, NS and QC, and now ON provide ombuds or advocacy services for children and youth as
part of larger institutions serving the entire population.
39
Ibid at 107, 176.
40
Ibid at 176.
41
Ibid at 177.
42
Ibid at 45.
43
Ibid at 59.
44
Ibid at 48.
35

23

Doing Better: Jordan’s Principle Accountability Mechanisms Report

model was considered a hybrid model as it has functions of an ombuds, powers of a
commissioner of inquiry and structural independence of an auditor general.45
5. Thematic Ombuds Institutions – Human Rights Commissions
Reif explains that Human Rights commissions have the same elements as a classic ombuds,
other than their jurisdiction. Human rights commissions have jurisdiction over human rights
protection and most have varying human rights prevention mandates,46 Their scopes vary and
may include the protection of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.47 Some may
have a specific role or function to monitor particular human rights issues such as the relations
with Indigenous people.48
Human rights commissions typically have a broad mandate49 and functions including complaint
based investigatory powers, own motions investigations, holding public inquiries, making
recommendations and reports, powers to bring or intervene in litigation and/or other legal
avenues. Some also have human right promotion powers such as research, public awarenessraising, training, education and advice to governments.50 Other human rights mandated
functions include creating promotional information, education, advising, providing
recommendations to governments, law reform, and investigatory powers.51
Some examples of human rights commissions in Canada include:
· The Quebec Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la
jeunesse Although similar to the Commission at the federal level, the Québec CDPJ
has a specific unit dedicated to handling youth protection investigations.52
· The Canadian Human Rights Commission: At a federal level, the CHRC has
numerous functions including a significant public human rights education and
promotion role, public interest role by researching and monitoring systemic patterns
and practices and investigating, mediating and referring matters to the CHRT.53

45

Ibid at 6.
Reif supra note 3 at 61.
47
Marshall & Reif supra note 19 at 232; Ibid at 7.
48
Chartrand supra note 5 at 20.
49
Reif supra note 3 at 157.
50
Ibid at 15.
51
Ibid at 154, 155.
52
“Investigations (Youth Protection)” (March 2022) online: Québec Commission des droits de la personne
et des droits de la jeunesse.
53
Gwen Brodsky, Shelagh Day & Frances Kelly, “The Authority of Human Rights Tribunals to Grant
Systemic Remedies” 2017 CanLIIDocs 45 at p. 34.
46
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6. Human Rights Tribunals
A final type of independent accountability institution is a tribunal. An accountability institution
becomes a quasi-judicial administrative tribunal when it has abilities to make legally binding
decisions. Tribunals perform a quasi-judicial but not a purely judicial function. Administrative
tribunals may have a particular expertise, and due to this expertise, they may be enabled by
statute to deal with claims that are broader than those dealt with by courts and to grant forward–
looking systemic remedies to deal with policy issues and further social goals and to remain
seized of matters longer than courts.54 Although the tribunal process will be formal, it does not
need to be an adversarial process. It is important that the tribunal is impartial, non-political and
has a level of expertise.55 There is a wide variety of judicial and administrative tribunals in
Canada.56 There are some limitations to tribunals due to their capacity to make legally binding
decisions. This capacity means the work and process of the institutions subject to administrative
law standards and reviews. This can seriously limit the flexibility and informality of the
institution’s work and process.57 A major concern related to this type of institution is the
accessibility.58
At times, an independent and accessible appeal tribunal is established within a broader
independent accountability institution in order to hear matters where a resolution has not been
reached through the “advisory” part of the institution. These enforcement and adjudication
abilities are developed to ensure accountability and reform where more informal individual
advocacy, systemic reports or advice to governments are not sufficient to protect human
rights.59
An example of a human rights tribunal in Canada includes:
· The Canadian Human Rights Tribunal: An important feature of the CHRT is its
ability to make binding orders and grant remedies.60 The CHRC and CHRT are a
“federal human rights machinery […] comprised of an adjudicative body and a
Commission. Both are “essential to the remedial function of the legislation”.61
Chartrand characterizes the CHRC and CHRT as “a more formally structured
process than the Ombudsman Office although less formally structured than the court
system. It is intended to be accessible to everyone and in particular those
individuals that have been most marginalized in society”.62

54

Ibid at 31.
Ibid at 26.
56
Greene supra note 24 at 2.
57
Brodsky, Day & Kelly supra note 53 at 32.
58
Ibid at 22.
59
Ibid at 24, 25.
60
Ibid at 19.
61
Ibid at 34.
62
Chartrand supra note 5 at 19.
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As a final point, we wish to address possible confusion around use of different terminology for
Ombuds-like mechanisms such as Ombudsman, Advocates or Commissioners. The terms are
largely synonymous. Any distinction seems to be one of degree versus difference in kind (e.g.,
they are all forms of ombuds). For example, ‘Commissions’ are considered a
variation/adaptation of the ombuds model, though sometimes viewed as having broader powers
than the “traditional/ classic-based” model.63 As between Commissions/Ombuds and Advocates,
the former seem to stand in a more neutral/impartial place (until a complaint is substantiated),
whereas children’s advocates may have more active role in defending the rights of children and
youth due to the fact that most are mandated to uphold children’s rights, including the UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child. However, like Ombuds/Commissions, Advocates
investigate complaints and write reports about their investigations.

63

See Marshall & Reif supra note 19 at 226 footnote 50: "The term "Ombudsman" is used in many
countries that have adapted the office from its Scandinavian roots (e.g. provinces of Canada, New
Zealand). Other English language synonyms are: "Parliamentary Commissioner for Administrative
Investigations" (e.g. Queensland, Western Australia); "Commissioner for Administrative Complaints"
(Hong Kong); and "Parliamentary Commissioner for Administration" (e.g. United Kingdom, Sri Lanka). In
French-speaking jurisdictions see e.g.: Mediateur (e.g. France, Senegal, Mauritania); Protecteur du
Citoyen (Qufbec); Defenseur du Peuple (Madagascar). In Spanish-speaking countries see e.g.: Defensor
de/ Pueblo (e.g. Argentina, Spain); Defensor de los Habitantes (Costa Rica). In India, the office is called
Lok Ayukta.” See also Michelle Lebaron, in “Watchdogs and Wise Ones in Winter Lands: The Practice
Spectrum of Canadian Ombudsman” Liz Hoffman Ombudsperson Research Award Paper, Forum of
Canadian Ombudsman (FCO) 2008 at p. 11, made the following note "No classical ombudsman has been
appointed in the federal sector, while some specialized ombudsman offices have been instituted, such as
the offices of the Commissioner of Official Languages, the Correctional Investigator, and newer offices
like the Taxpayers’ Ombudsman/Ombudsman des Contribuables.
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Part 1: Why is there a need for accountability when it comes to Indigenous
children and families?
Simply put, there is a need for accountability because federal and provincial governments in
Canada have both contributed to the taking away of thousands of Indigenous children from their
families and communities. This has wreaked countless harms on individual children, their
families, their communities and nations. This started with the residential school system but
morphed into the child welfare system after World War 2. In the last 70 years, the most
significant contribution to this overrepresentation has been the inadequate provision of services
to meet the needs of Indigenous children and families. Both the federal and provincial
governments have been reluctant to fully fund services to Indigenous peoples, relying on
dubious jurisdictional arguments to justify such discrimination. This continues up to the present.
The watershed finding from the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal in Caring Society in 2016 that
Canada had been knowingly underfunding its First Nations Child and Family Services Program
underscores this point. The fact that the Tribunal has made 21 further orders since, many of
these finding Canada to be in non-compliance with the original ruling, accentuates how
pervasive these problems are. In its ruling on monetary compensation for the discrimination in
the case, the Tribunal noted, “this case of racial discrimination is one of the worst possible
cases warranting the maximum award.”64 Below, we examine the context in relation to First
Nations child and family services informing the need for accountability mechanisms.
a) The history of First Nations child welfare services
Paradoxically, the taking of children away from Indigenous families and communities stems from
both the exercise of extraordinary amounts of control over the lives of Indigenous peoples by
governments in Canada, as well as these governments exhibiting extraordinary neglect for the
well-being of Indigenous children and families. To carry out its objective to ‘kill the Indian in the
child,’ Canada used the Indian Act and RCMP, among other forms of state control, to take
thousands of Indigenous children from their families and place them in residential schools
between the 1880s and 1950s.65 The TRC Final Report documented Canada’s refusal to
adequately fund health services as a cause of high illness and death rates of Indigenous
children in residential schools.66 Coinciding with the federal government’s decision to gradually
divest itself of residential schools, with the federal government’s endorsement in the form of
reimbursement of provincial costs, provincial child welfare systems were extended on reserve to
effectively become the new residential school system.67 Especially from the 1960s to the 1980s
provincial legislation was used to apprehend large numbers of First Nations children from their
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families, sometimes on the slightest of pretext (the “Sixties Scoop”).68 Indigenous communities
had no say, nor any mechanisms to stop these governments from making these forceful
interventions in the lives of their children and families.69 Overrepresentation of Indigenous
children in provincial child welfare systems remains a significant problem today and has been
dubbed the ‘Millennial Scoop.’70
These problems are also rooted in over 70 years of jurisdictional wrangling between the federal
government and provincial governments, with neither level of government wishing to assume full
responsibility for the provision of essential services to Indigenous peoples. This includes child
and family services, but also health, education, social assistance, assisted living, housing and
more.71 While both levels of government gradually assumed some role in the delivery of child
and family services to Indigenous peoples, perpetual disputes over who is responsible for
paying for essential services for “Indians” have been used by all governments as justification for
doing less, causing significant harm to Indigenous children and families.72 In 2019 Final Report,
the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls named this
problem “interjurisdictional neglect” and suggested that it violated the s. 7 Charter rights to life,
liberty and security of the person of Indigenous women and girls.73
Notably, starting in the 1960s, the federal government begrudgingly accepted temporary
responsibility to provide some essential services to First Nations on reserve such as social
assistance. Funding and services were intended to be provided at levels comparable to
provincial services to other citizens. Although this became permanent and extended to a
broader range of reserves, Canada resisted legislating in these areas or putting in place other
accountability mechanisms to ensure adequate services or funding, despite the Auditor General
and other reports highlighting the need for better accountability. Canada also downplayed its
responsibility in relation to providing essential services, suggesting such services were not
based on constitutional obligations, but simply a matter of good public policy.74
In the 1970s and early 1980s, First Nations began voicing concerns about services that were
either lacking or utterly inappropriate and calling for more community-based services. In
response, Canada began to gradually devolve program delivery to First Nations through funding
68
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agreements, however, the federal government maintained ultimate control over funding levels
and program terms and conditions. The funding agreements lacked effective dispute resolution
mechanisms to permit First Nations to hold Canada accountable for inadequate funding.
In the context of child and family services, Canada unilaterally created the First Nations Child
and Family Services Program (FNCFS Program) under Directive 20-1 in 1991, which required
FNCFS Agencies to operate pursuant to provincial child welfare laws, with federal funding. The
creation of the FNCFS Program spurred the establishment of over 100 FNCFS Agencies across
Canada, intended to provide more culturally appropriate child welfare services to First Nations
children. It quickly became apparent, however, that the funding formula under Directive 20-1
was entirely inadequate to provide preventative and culturally appropriate services. The formula
did not provide funding comparable to the range of child welfare services funded in the province,
and often resulted in situations where children were apprehended because alternative services
could not be funded under Directive 20-1.
Two expert reports commissioned by the Assembly of First Nations and Canada in 2000 and
2005 confirmed the systemic underfunding in the FNCFS program. Despite these reports,
Canada did little to implement their recommendations. In 2008, Canada developed a new
funding formula, called the Enhanced Prevention Focused Approach (EPFA), and slowly began
implementing it in some regions of the country. The EPFA, however, was only a slight
improvement over Directive 20-1 and continued to perpetuate inequities in the FNCFS.75
An important development in this period was the Federal House of Commons unanimously
affirming Jordan’s Principle in 2007, a child-first principle to ensure no gaps or delays in
services to First Nations children.76 The Principle is in memory of Jordan River Anderson, a First
Nations boy from Manitoba, born with multiple disabilities, who died in hospital never getting to
live close to his family, due to jurisdictional wrangling between Canada and the province over
who would pay his medical costs were he moved closer to home. The Principle requires that
the first government approached by a First Nations community pay for the requested services
for a First Nations child, and that any jurisdictional disputes be resolved afterwards. While
Canada committed to, and ear-marked substantial funds to implement, Jordan’s Principle, these
funds were never used due to the very narrow interpretation given to the Principle by the federal
government.77
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b) First Nations Caring Society et al. v Canada
Given the lack of commitment by Canada to make real reform to the FNCFS Program, the
Caring Society and the AFN filed a human rights complaint with the Canadian Human Rights
Commission in 2007. After nine years, which saw several delays by Canada, retaliation against
Dr. Cindy Blackstock, as well as attempts to strike the complaint,78 the Tribunal ordered in
favour of the complainants in 2016 (“Main Decision”).79 It found that discrimination on the basis
of race and/or national ethnic origin was made out, and in the course of its extensive reasons,
made several important findings, including that:
●

Canada is not a “passive player” in funding child welfare services but exercises
significant control and power over child welfare services on reserve. Canada may have
a fiduciary obligation to act in the best interest of First Nations children and families to
ensure the child welfare programming is adequate and culturally appropriate.80

●

The funding models used by Canada underfund prevention services, do not ensure
services are culturally appropriate, and in fact create incentives to remove children from
their homes as a first resort rather than as a last resort, replicating the residential school
era. It also resembles the residential school era because the fate and future of many
First Nations children is still being determined by the Canadian government.81

●

Canada knew its FNCFS program was not comparable to provincial services but had
resisted doing any comparative (gap) study. Evidence before the Tribunal included an
internal report from 2006 showing the Department of Indigenous Services knew it was
underfunding First Nations, stating, “if current social programs were administered by the
provinces, this would result in significant increase in costs for INAC.”82

●

While Canada failed to provide services comparable to the provinces, this standard in
itself is discriminatory. Human rights principles, both domestically and internationally,
require INAC to consider the distinct needs and circumstances of First Nations children
and families living on-reserve–including their cultural, historical and geographical needs
and circumstances–in order to ensure substantive equality in the provision of child and
family services to them. Simply attempting to mirror provincial for First Nations
communities runs afoul of human rights principles.83

●

Canada had wrongly adopted a very narrow interpretation of Jordan’s Principle, which
had been adopted by a unanimous resolution of Parliament in 2007 as being limited to
children with multiple disabilities and not to child welfare or other services. Jordan’s
Principle requires coordination and cooperation between the provincial and federal
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governments, as well as between departments of the same government, to address
gaps and delays in health and social services. The Tribunal’s language suggested
Jordan’s Principle applies to all federal programs aimed at addressing the needs of
children and families on reserve.84
The Tribunal ordered Canada to stop its discriminatory practices and reform of FNCFS
programs, stating, “a REFORM of the FNCFS Program is needed in order to build a solid
foundation for the program to address the real needs of First Nations children and families living
on reserve.”85 It retained jurisdiction over the case in order to consider compensation and other
remedies requested by the Complainants, and until all of its orders are implemented. Canada
did not appeal this case and committed to make reforms to address its findings.86
c) Canada’s conduct since the Main Decision
Since the Main Decision, the Tribunal has found several instances of non-compliance by
Canada, particularly its failure to implement a broad interpretation of Jordan’s Principle and an
effective process to respond to Jordan’s Principle requests and appeals. The non-compliance
decisions point to a number of systemic and accountability issues, such as resistance to depart
from old approaches (using comparability instead of substantive equality and narrow definition
of services and children covered by Jordan’s Principle)87, using funding authorities to justify
inaction,88 failure to collect appropriate data to properly assess Jordan’s Principle requests89
and needs, and lack of arm's-length appeal process.90
While ISC has been attempting to respond to the rulings of the Tribunal by providing education
to staff and modifying some of its processes, such as funding community service coordinators to
help applicants and changing its Jordan’s Principle appeals process, there is a need for
ongoing, comprehensive assessment of Canada’s commitment to Jordan’s Principle and
substantive equality. Staff turnover at the Department is reported to be high and implementing
meaningful change within the bureaucracy of ISC seems to be a real challenge. Further, the
modified appeal process the Department sought to introduce was stalled due to vacancies.91
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A 2021 article based on assessment of the Jordan’s Principle in the Alberta region highlights
how onerous the Jordan’s Principle application process can be for applicants.92 Requiring
applicants to provide documentary evidence and particularize how a request aligns with
substantive equality were identified as particularly burdensome, resulting in several complaints
being treated as ineligible for consideration by the Department.93 This was confirmed by our
own analysis of data provided by ISC for the year 2019-2020, which showed that over 51% of
Jordan’s Principle requests in that year (32,587 out of 62,888) were not considered due to being
assessed as submitted with insufficient information.94 Finally, in interviews, Caring Society staff
and lawyers for the complainants emphasized the crucial importance of oversight to ISC’s
approach to Jordan’s Principle.
Early on in our research, we conducted a survey to gather further information about the current
issues and needs for an accountability mechanism for Jordan’s Principle. We received thirteen
responses mostly from Jordan’s Principle Navigators and a couple of Indigenous Services
Canada Jordan’s Principle National staff. Some challenges and barriers identified included:
burdensome document requirements in the initial application and appeals process; lack of
knowledge of the Indigenous context by ISC staff; high turnover of limited staff at ISC; failure of
provincial governments coming to the table; timelines and delays; the perception that the current
individual case-by-case process for Jordan’s Principle fails to create broader and more
meaningful change; the need for clear parameters and policy guidelines to assist service
coordinators; ISC staff do not understand substantive equality and communities bear the burden
of explaining the needs for substantive equality in their applications; lack of aging out of care
supports; lack of consistency; and vague reasons for denials.
Canada has also shown ongoing resistance to reform of its funding approach to the FNCFS
Program from one based on ad-hoc budget allocations to one that is needs-based, and
informed by principles of self-government. Merely increasing funding for FNCFS services
through annual budget allocations was found to be inconsistent with the Main Decision and the
Tribunal ordered Canada in 2018 to develop an alternative system of funding based on needs
assessments of Agencies and a cost-analysis of the real needs of First Nations agencies.95 The
Tribunal contemplated, however, that nation-to-nation self-government agreements over child
welfare could be an alternative to Canada’s FNCFS Program, however, it is clear that the
funding of such self-government would need to reflect the principles set out in the Main
Decision.96 Details of long-term reform in relation to funding have yet to be released by
Canada.
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As part of responding to the Main Decision, as well the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions’
call to action for national child welfare legislation, Canada passed An Act respecting First
Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, SC 2019, c 24 (“C92”).97 The law sets out
minimum standards to be followed when an Indigenous child is involved in child apprehension
matters, which overlays the various provincial child welfare laws.98 It also recognizes
Indigenous groups’ inherent right to self-government in the area of child and family services and
sets out a framework for how Indigenous governing bodies can pass their own laws.99 C92
legislates Jordan’s Principle in s. 9(3)(e):
in order to promote substantive equality between Indigenous children and other children,
a jurisdictional dispute must not result in a gap in the child and family services that are
provided in relation to Indigenous children.
This was confirmed by the Quebec Court of Appeal in a recent reference decision on C92.100
However, C92 remains unclear as to which level of government as between Canada and the
provinces bears primary responsibility for funding compliance with national standards and selfgovernment.101 Canada could have chosen to clarify this issue in the legislation, but chose not
to, raising fears that C92 will be used to perpetuate the same jurisdictional wrangling that has
plagued this area for over 70 years.102 This problem was also highlighted in the QCCA C92
Reference.103 While C92 raises the prospect for the creation of a dispute resolution mechanism
through regulation, we have yet to hear any further plans by Canada to implement such a
mechanism.
Further, we have heard of some ISC staff saying that the Main Decision has no bearing on C92
issues, but we clearly believe this to be in error and demonstrative of a lack of real appreciation
of the Main Decision, or the extent of Canada’s obligations to conform with the right to
substantive equality, statutory human rights and international law obligations in relation to
Indigenous peoples.104 In addition, there are concerns that the timeline for negotiating
collaboration agreements under C92 (1 year) are unrealistic and may position communities to
exercise jurisdiction without funding (which could be disastrous). We have heard issues of
97
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Indigenous Governing Bodies receiving conflicting information about negotiation terms from
federal negotiators and being asked to sign confidentiality agreements, which raises issues of
government transparency. The QCCA’s suggested approach to negotiations and paramountcy
around Indigenous law under C92, if it is upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada, will require
education of provinces and others about their roles and limits on their powers, as well
accessible ways to address potential disputes between Indigenous governments and
intransigent provinces.105 There are also significant needs for resources for carrying out
education and capacity building around C92 more generally, including for communities, for ISC
and CIRNAC staff, as well as those involved in the enforcement of child welfare laws and
implementation on the national standards, such social workers, Crown lawyers, legal aid
lawyers and judges.106 It is surprising to us that, despite the stated importance of C92 by
Parliament, Canada did not commit the same amount of resources for education and capacity
building as it did for changes to the Divorce Act, or when the Family Homes on Reserves and
Matrimonial Interests or Rights Act was rolled out with a Centre of Excellence.107
There also appears to be significant reluctance on the part of Canada to see the reform it needs
to undertake to address long-standing systemic underfunding in services that affect long-term
child and family well-being. It is clear from several statements from the Tribunal that Jordan’s
Principle is only intended as a temporary stop-gap measure to address gaps in underfunding
and under-servicing in its services on the way to Canada overhauling these services to remove
such gaps and inadequacy.108 However, it is not at all clear that this is understood by the
Department. Our concern is Canada simply seeing Jordan’s Principle as akin to a program
without addressing the systemic inequality that underlies the necessity for Jordan’s Principle in
the first place.
In their 2021 paper, Vandna Sinha, Colleen Sheppard et al., echo our concern. They
characterize ISC’s approach to Jordan’s Principle as an individualistic, demand-driven process,
and less as a requirement to ensure substantive and systematic equality in services and
develop proactive policies and practices for securing equitable services for First Nations
children and families. The authors describe how such an approach results in funding only being
provided to First Nations individuals or communities with the capacity and wherewithal to make
Jordan Principle requests, and needs are not being systematically assessed across
105
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communities.109 This is exacerbated by ISC’s lack of transparency in publishing details of group
requests made or approved by First Nations organizations and communities or the range of
services or level of funding that First Nations can request.110 The authors refer to this as a
“project system” or “projectification” approach and argue it is especially inappropriate given the
degree of systemic inequality First Nations face:
This case by case approach to the implementation of Jordan’s Principle can be
described as what Tania Murray Li calls a “project system.” In discussing this approach
in relation to issues of rural development, she argues that the project system or
“projectification” encourages people to think that a problem can be fixed without actually
addressing the underlying processes that created the problem in the first place. Such an
approach fails to make long-term systemic change, so when the time-bound project
ends, the problems the projects were intended to address persist." …
Under the demand-driven approach to Jordan’s Principle, relief is contingent on the
ingenuity, knowledge and ability of individual, community-based actors to make effective
Jordan’s Principle claims. Individuals or groups with identical needs may go
unrecognized if they do not have the capacity to formulate Jordan’s Principle requests,
or if they fail to provide sufficient evidence of how the request is linked to substantive
equality. …
An individualistic, case-by-case approach to Jordan’s Principle might be appropriate if
First Nations children generally had access to equitable services. Exceptional, aberrant
individual or group cases outside this norm of equitable services could be addressed
through the Jordan’s Principle claims process. However, the reality is that the problem of
inequitable services for First Nations children living on reserves is persistent, systemic
and impacts a wide range of health, social and education services. In such a context, the
remedy of individual claims is a sorely inadequate means of addressing the challenge of
larger systemic and structural problems.111
Building on the authors point about how inappropriate projectification can be in the context of
systemic inequality of services to First Nations children and families, in our review of ISC
Jordan’s Principle data, we noted that for 2019-2020, 67% of individual requests and 87% of
groups requests were within the normative standard of care, and in 2020-21, 51% of individual
requests and 40% of groups requests were within the normative standard of care.112 Services
meeting “normative standard of care” are those that are readily available to children and families
in the province of reference.113 Thus, ISC’s data reveals that a high degree of approved
requests under Jordan’s Principle were for services that are already provided to children within
the province. Children and families in the province are not required to go through an extensive
109
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process similar to the Jordan’s Principle request process in order to access such services. This
sheds light on the degree of systemic inequality that continues to exist within ISC’s system of
essential services for First Nations. Further, future plans on the direction of Jordan’s Principle
put forward by ISC suggest a long-term vision of Jordan’s Principle funding into the future (albeit
administered by communities directly), as opposed to fixing the problems in existing programs
and services. We believe there is a strong need for oversight of ISC to ensure they are not
getting stuck in projectification, but in fact addressing and reforming all their programs and
services that further the well-being of Indigenous children and suffer from underfunding and
under-servicing.
The data on Jordan Principle requests suggests systemic inequality in a wide number of areas
of ISC services from education, to health services (medical equipment and supplies, medical
transportation, medical / nutritional supplements, mental wellness, oral health, orthodontics and
vision care), child development, assisted living and respite, infrastructure, social assistance.114
There are areas, such as with orthodontics and capital repairs and costs, that ISC has been
reluctant to treat as falling within Jordan’s Principle and intervention of the tribunal or the courts
has been necessary.115 The Caring Society relates there are certain areas, such as
administration / governance costs, that ISC remains reluctant to fund pursuant to Jordan’s
Principle.
Even beyond the implications of the Main Decision, ISC should be striving to reform its services
based on the commitments within Department of Indigenous Services Act, SC 2019, c 29, s 336
(“DISA”), which came into effect in July 2019. DISA replaced the old Department of Indian
Affairs and Northern Development Act, RSC 1985, c I-6 and introduced some important
standards that were absent from the old act. These include:
●

Identifying the group the Department services as “Indigenous peoples” which is defined
as having the same meaning as “Aboriginal peoples” within subsection 35(2) of the
Constitution Act, 1982. Section 35(2) defines “Aboriginal peoples of Canada” as
including the “the Indian, Inuit and Métis peoples of Canada.”

●

Listing the main activities and responsibilities to be undertaken by the Department.
Section 6(2) of the Act states that “[t]he Minister shall ensure services with respect to …
(a) child and family services; (b) education; (c) health; (d) social development; (e)
economic development; (f) housing; (g) infrastructure; (h) emergency management;
[and] (h.1) governance…”.

●

The preamble of DISA includes commitments by Canada to ensure its service standards
are transparent, meets the needs of Indigenous group, consider the socio-economic
gaps and negative social factors impacting Indigenous individuals in doing its work,
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recognize and promote Indigenous ways of knowing, being and doing, and collaborate
and cooperate with Indigenous peoples in its work.
●

Section 7(a) of the Act sets out a requirement of the Minister to collaborate in the
development, provision, assessment and improvement of the services listed at s 6(2).

In other words, DISA requires ISC to ensure that all of its services and programs are needsbased and address socio-economic gaps, and that reform of such programs be done in
collaboration with Indigenous communities.116 It is not clear to what extent DISA is being
followed by the Department at this time. We believe there is a need for oversight of ISC for its
compliance with DISA.
Finally, the DISA commits Canada to implementing the United Nations Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous, as does Canada’s 2021 law, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples Act, SC 2021, c 14, which affirms the Declaration as a universal human
rights instrument with application to Canadian law. The Declaration contains several articles
that ought to inform Canada’s delivery of services to Indigenous peoples, including that Canada
must take effective measures, and where appropriate, special measures to ensure the
continuing improvement of Indigenous peoples’ economic and social conditions.117 We believe
there is a need for oversight of ISC for its compliance with the Declaration and UNDRIPA.
d) Role of First Nations Caring Society since the Main Decision
Since the Main Decision, Dr. Blackstock and the Caring Society have been playing a crucial
advocacy role in supporting families in seeking to access Jordan’s Principle and substantive
equality, informally providing oversight of ISC’s implementation of the CHRT decisions, by
bringing issues of non-compliance to the Tribunal’s attention as well as continuing to publicly
raise awareness of systemic discrimination against First Nations children and families. Further,
by drawing on its network of lawyers who assist it on a pro bono basis, the Caring Society has
engaged in strategic interventions such as intervening with ISC National Office staff to discuss
matters on Jordan Principle files as well seeking judicial review of denials, for example, in the
case of Josey and Stacy Shiner regarding denial of orthodontics. While this judicial review was
unsuccessful, a settlement was reached which included a policy change that considers pain as
a criteria for NIHB eligibility.118 In the case of Carolyn Buffalo-Jackson and her son Noah, the
Caring Society and a pro bono lawyer prevented a First Nations mother’s human right complaint
relating to her disabled son from being dismissed by the Canadian Human Rights Commission,
leading to a settlement with ISC. In this particular case, Carolyn was both a lawyer and First
Nation Chief and still faced significant barriers in navigating the Jordan’s Principle and human

See also Naiomi Metallic, ““Making the most out of Canada’s new Department of Indigenous Services
Act,” Policy Brief for Yellowhead Institute, August 12, 2019.
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rights system.119 This and other stories of the Caring Societies’ interventions provides
compelling case-studies of the ongoing needs for advocacy vis-à-vis Canada when it comes to
the need for services.
The Caring Society does not receive any funding from Canada but relies on fundraising to
sustain itself. In carrying out its extensive advocacy, it relies on its small staff and the
generosity of lawyers and other professionals who assist it in its work. The Society and its staff
recognize that they cannot help all who need assistance and support and, in our conversations
with them, have emphasized the need for formalized and funded advocacy services for First
Nations children and families.
e) Role of the provinces
From the 1990s and onwards, some provinces amended their child welfare policies and
legislation to attempt to accommodate Indigenous cultures and give some voice to Indigenous
communities in apprehension matters. However, such changes were not universal and resulted
in a patchwork of protections across the country.120 This provided unequal protections to
Indigenous children across the country until the coming into force of C92. When it comes to the
provision of child and family services to First Nations, we are not aware of any provinces who
were willing to provide funding to meet the child and family of First Nations children and families
to address the shortfalls of the FNCFS Program between the 1990s and 2016.
More broadly, in relation to the provision of services to Indigenous people, despite some
provinces endorsing Jordan’s Principle (AB, SK, MB, ON, NB, NFLD), up to the present, there
continues to be significant reluctance on the part of the provinces to provide services to
Indigenous peoples, particularly First Nations living on reserve, although, constitutionally, there
is nothing preventing them from doing so.121 This is illustrated in the 2020 Manitoba Human
Rights Panel decision of Sumner-Pruden v. Manitoba.122 In this case, Manitoba’s Human Rights
Panel agreed that the province discriminated against a young First Nations man with multiple
disabilities and his mother for delay, and often denial, of healthcare and related services based
on their First Nations status and the fact they lived on reserve. The Panel found that the delays
and denials were caused by the policies and practices arising from the exercise of concurrent
jurisdiction between the province and federal government, and this amounted to adverse effects
discrimination.123 Importantly, the Panel also found that the province could not rely on
Carolyn Buffalo, “Buffalo v Canada – My Family’s Fight for the Right for Noah to ride a bus to school,”
PowerPoint Presentation, 2017.
120
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jurisdictional arguments to justify the discrimination, noting, “The Canadian constitutional
framework does not amount to a reasonable justification for the discriminatory treatment of the
complainants.”124 Further illustrating provincial reluctance, Manitoba has appealed this ruling,
continuing to maintain Canada’s ability to fund and/or provide health and disability services on
the First Nation constitutes a bone fide and reasonable cause for discrimination . This matter
also further illustrates the need and importance of advocacy support services as the
complainants in the case are represented by lawyers from the Public Interest Law Centre, and
only citizens of Manitoba have access to this service.
We have also heard that some provinces have recently been denying funding services for urban
Indigenous children in light of Canada’s approach to Jordan’s Principle since the Main Decision.
In our discussion with ISC, Canada advised that it has yet to develop a system for negotiating
reimbursement with the provinces in relation to services that Canada determines ought to be
paid by provinces. These examples illustrate a further need to hold provinces more accountable
to their substantive equality and Jordan’s Principle obligations. The Assembly of Seven
Generations report clearly emphasized that Indigenous youth and children deserve justice and
reparations for the harms that continue to impact daily lives, and in this regard “Indigenous
youth and children deserve accountability and responsibility from the federal government, as
well as all levels of government.”125
Beyond the provinces providing services, another area of needed oversight is in relation to
those who enforce provincial child welfare laws–and now C92 as well–including agencies,
government lawyers and judges, as well as those who represent parents and communities in
child welfare proceedings, namely legal aid lawyers and members of the private bar. As noted
earlier, there is a major need, especially with the coming into force of C92, for these actors to
learn about their obligations under C92. More generally, there is a need to ensure that child
welfare law enforcement is carried out appropriately with a knowledge and sensitivity to the
history of residential schools and the overrepresentation of Indigenous children in state care
through the Sixties Scoop and even up to the present. There are existing accountability bodies
that already provide some oversight of child welfare enforcement in the provinces, but it is
questionable whether these bodies provide sufficient attention to the challenges faced by
Indigenous children and families. We explore this question further in the next section.
f) Conclusion
Addressing the causes of overrepresentation of Indigenous children in state care is a complex
matter with deep systemic discrimination underlying it - many of the problems stem from
Canada and the provinces’ reluctance to prioritize and fund Indigenous children and families’
needs. Canadian courts have done little to protect or vindicate these interests over the past 70
years. While courts provide some backstop on accountability issues, such as in matters of
judicial review, generally, they lack the jurisdiction to address systemic discrimination
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complaints in the same way as human rights bodies or provide the types of systemic remedies
that are needed to address long-standing systemic problems.126
Through the Main Decision and subsequent orders, the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal has
been instrumental in holding the federal government accountable for systemic underfunding in
the FNCFS Program and implementing Jordan’s Principle. This is especially so because the
Tribunal is remaining seized of its jurisdiction over the case until all outstanding remedial issues
have been addressed. There will come a day, however, when the Tribunal will relinquish
jurisdiction over the case. Given the very long history of systemic discrimination against
Indigenous people by the government in Canada, particularly in the area of service delivery, we
are not hopeful that this will signal the end of all such discrimination and believe it will be
important to have alternative accountability mechanisms in place. Further, like the courts, the
role of tribunals are reactive and not proactive. Tribunals and courts decide the matters in front
of them based on evidence put forward by the parties. They cannot entertain or propose
broader systemic solutions to problems. This is what fuels the need for consideration of other
accountability mechanisms.

See for example Malone v Canada (AG), 2021 FC 127, where a child self-identified as Mi’kmaq
Acadian with connections to the Mi’kmaq First Nations people flowing through their maternal side since
1700’s was seeking judicial review of the ISC Jordan’s Principle Appeals Committee’s decision to deny
him funding under Jordan’s Principle on the basis that such funding was only available to First Nations
children registered as Indians under the Indian Act. In denying the judicial review, the Federal Court was
deferential to Canada’s approach to eligibility criteria for Jordan’s Principle without scrutinizing the
systemic discrimination underlying such criteria. This is in stark contrast to the analysis of the Canadian
Human Rights Tribunal on the issues of lack of Indian status and Jordan’s Principle eligibility criteria in
2019 CHRT 7 (interim) and 2020 CHRT 36.
126
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Part 2: What specific issues should be addressed by an accountability
mechanism?
In undertaking our research, we learned there are several options and minute details to consider
around different accountability mechanisms. It can be easy to get distracted by these.
However, Linda Reif, author of Ombuds Institutions, Good Governance and the International
Human Rights System, reminded us that the driving question in designing any accountability
mechanism should be, “What are the real accountability problems we want to address?”
Based on the context and issues related in Part 1, we have identified ten different accountability
problems that we strongly feel must be addressed in the context of ensuring the well-being of
Indigenous children in Canada. We set these out below, explaining why these are crucial
accountability needs that must be addressed. In the next section, we identify key features of
effective accountability mechanisms and recommend three different accountability mechanisms
that we believe can most effectively address these accountability needs if implemented
together.
Need #1: Oversight of the current Jordan's Principle process at ISC
We heard very clearly from Caring Society staff and the lawyers who have been involved in the
case that this has to be a key function of any accountability mechanism. We heard concerns
about the design of the Jordan’s Principle request process, inadequate funding to cover all costs
related to the provision of child and family services, delays in process requests, inability to
accommodate urgent and emergency cases, lack of transparency in decision-making and data
collection, and more. In their 2021 article, Sinha et al. identify a number of short-term
recommendations to improve the current Jordan’s Principle process.127 However, they also
stress that ongoing, comprehensive assessment of Canada’s commitment to Jordan’s Principle
is needed, including collection and independent analysis of data collected by ISC.128 We agree.
At this time, given the deep systemic inequality in services faced by First Nations children, an
effective Jordan’s Principle process is necessary in order to meet the immediate needs of
Indigenous children and families, and we believe that any body providing independent oversight
and recommendations to ISC is the best way to ensure this. While ISC staff may be wellintentioned and committed to implementing the Tribunals orders, staff turnover is frequent, the
legacy of systemic discrimination runs deep within ISC, challenges due to the confidential
nature of Jordan’s Principle requests, and concerns of retaliation when staff attempt to address
systemic discrimination, all demonstrate the need for independent oversight by a body with
expertise in the nature of systemic discrimination faced by Indigenous children and families is in
order to ensure that mistakes of the past are not repeated.
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Need #2: Overseeing of ISC’s long-term reform of CFS, including funding of agencies, as
well as CIRNAC’s funding and negotiation of self-government under C92
Understandably, given the immediate needs of First Nations children and families, a lot of the
focus and attention since the Main Decision has been on effectively implementing Jordan’s
Principle. However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that one of the main orders from the Main
Decision was for Canada to “REFORM” the FNCFS Program, or that much of the evidence in
the case was about Canada knowingly underfunding the Program for over a decade.129 There
are few public details available about the plans for long term reform in relation to the FNCFS
program. We are surprised that, almost six years since the Main Decision, there isn’t more
available. This indicates a strong need for an independent oversight of Canada in order to
ensure that it follows through with long-term reform of the FNCFS Program.
The introduction of the C92 legislation was in response to addressing long-term reform of child
welfare, and needs to be viewed as such.130 If ISC and CIRNAC staff are denying any
connection between the Main Decision and Canada’s obligations in relation to C92, internal
education and external accountability is needed. As noted early, the Tribunal clearly made a
connection between long-term reform and self-government.131 This means that the legal
principles identified as applicable to long-term reform, such as Canada’s key role in funding
child welfare services on reserve, its fiduciary obligations to ensure the best interest of First
Nations children and families,132 as well as the requirement to ensure substantive equality in
funding and services, are equally applicable to Canada’s obligations to fund self-government
under C92.
There have been concerns raised about Canada using the vague funding requirements in
relation to self-government in C92 to sustain the same types of jurisdictional wrangling that has
been harming Indigenous children and families for decades.133 Accounts of Canada not being
transparent or clear in its approach to funding negotiations, and requiring Indigenous governing
bodies to sign confidentiality agreements only accentuate these concerns. For these reasons,
we believe oversight of long-term reform over child welfare, including the implementation of
C92, is a serious accountability need that must be addressed.

Need #3: Oversight of Canada’s efforts addressing systemic inequality in services
related to Indigenous children and families
As noted earlier, there appears to be significant reluctance on the part of Canada to see that
long-term reform includes ending the long-standing systemic underfunding in its services that
129

Caring Society 2019, supra note 1 at para 463 and see also paras 267 and 335-339.
Canada first announced its plans to pass legislation at an national emergency meeting on Indigenous
child welfare - see note 97.
131
This is particularly apparent in 2018 CHRT 4, supra note 88 at paras 407-412
132
See Caring Society, supra note 1 at paras 90-110; and 2016 CHRT 10 at para 116.
133
See “An Act Respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis Children, Youth and Families: Does Bill C-92
make the grade?,” and “The promise and pitfalls of C-92: An Act Respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis
Children, Youth and Families,” supra note 102.
130

42

Doing Better: Jordan’s Principle Accountability Mechanisms Report

affect long-term child and family well-being. This includes, but is not limited to, ISC’s
programming in education, to health services, child development, assisted living and respite,
infrastructure, and social assistance. It is clear from the Main Decision and several subsequent
orders from the Tribunal that eliminating systemic inequality in the services that affect First
Nations children and families is the ultimate long-term objective of Jordan’s Principle.134
We agree with Sinha et al. that Canada must be held accountable to achieving substantive
equality in all services that affect long-term child and family well-being, not simply continuing to
use Jordan’s Principle as a stop gap measure.135 Otherwise, as they observe, this will simply
perpetuate ‘projectification’ of Jordan’s Principle and not address its true purpose. In this
regard, it will be crucial for Canada to see its obligation in relation to these services as providing
substantive equality, not just ensure a comparable level to provincial services, as this was found
to be discriminatory in the Main Decision. Further, the Department of Indigenous Services Act
also requires Canada to provide services that, similarly, are needs-based and address socioeconomic gaps faced by Indigenous groups.
Finally, there have been several reports, including from the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission and the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls
that have made several recommendations for the elimination systemic inequality in service
delivery in relation to Indigenous children and families. We believe that part of the oversight of
Canada here could also include assessment of relevant recommendations that Canada has
committed to implementing.

Need #4: Oversight of federal-provincial efforts at cooperation in relation to funding and
servicing of Indigenous children and families
Jordan’s Principle recognizes that jurisdictional disputes between the provincial and federal
governments (as well as disputes between departments within governments) should not result
in the delay or denial of services that an Indigenous child is entitled to. It is not just a resolution
of Parliament; it has been recognized by the courts and by the Tribunal as a human rights
principle, which has both a substantive equality right and jurisdictional dimension to ensure First
Nations children and families don’t bear the brunt of jurisdictional disputes.136
The government of first contact should pay first, with any disputes over who pays to be
determined between the governments at a later time. Under Canadian constitutional principles,
both the federal and provincial governments have the jurisdiction to provide services to
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Indigenous peoples. This is known as an area of ‘concurrent jurisdiction.’137 Jordan’s Principle
therefore mandates cooperation between the federal and provincial governments to ensure
essential services are received by First Nations children and families and to work out who is
responsible for funding what. However, there is currently little evidence that any such
cooperation is occuring. ISC has advised that it is currently not pursuing provinces for
reimbursement of any Jordan Principle expenses. While a handful of provinces have endorsed
Jordan’s Principle, few seem to be respecting it and most seem to still take the view that funding
services to Indigenous children and families is Canada’s sole responsibility.
While Canada seems to be carrying a majority of the responsibility for funding at this time (while
it continues to be heavily scrutinized for compliance with the Tribunal’s orders), we easily can
imagine a future date where a different administration of the federal government may claim it
has ‘done its part’ on Jordan’s Principle and say it is time for the provinces to pull their weight.
This would likely revive the old jurisdictional wrangling that has caused so much harm to
Indigenous children and families for decades. There is a need for a body to oversee and
monitor Canada and the provinces’ efforts to cooperate on this key human rights issue, as well
as make recommendations of legal principles and processes that can inform the cooperation
between Canada and the provinces on the sharing of funding responsibilities over Indigenous
services. Similar oversight is needed with respect to cooperation between Canada and the
provinces in relation to funding of self-government and compliance with national standards
under C92.

Need #5: Ongoing education to ISC, CIRNA, provincial DCS staff, provincial agencies,
Social workers, Crown lawyers, legal aid lawyers, judges.
There are ongoing education needs to ensure that ISC and CIRNA staff, as well as various
actors involved in the enforcement of provincial child welfare legislation and now C92. In order
for there to be meaningful change, all of these actors need to properly understand the context of
the systemic discrimination in services to Indigenous children and families that has resulted in
the overrepresentation of Indigenous children in care, and how this relates to and impacts how
these professionals carry out the functions of their position. As noted in the previous section,
some of this education is currently not happening, or only on an ad hoc basis. A systematic
approach to educating these individuals is needed.
There is also a strong need for Indigenous communities to receive education and capacity
building to support their efforts to exercise jurisdiction in relation to child and family services, as
well as understand their rights as set out in the minimum national standards under C92.
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Need #6: Investigating and mediating individual complaints about provincial
governments’ funding failure to provide services to Indigenous children and families
As noted previously, many provinces are currently not meeting their obligations to provide
services to Indigenous children and families. Most continue to take the position that this is the
sole or primary responsibility of the government of Canada.138 All provinces in Canada have
Ombuds or Ombuds-like offices that could, in theory, investigate denial of services by provinces
to Indigenous children and families. In practice, there is no evidence that provincial ombuds or
child advocates are holding provinces accountable for their responsibilities to provide services
to Indigenous children and families. This may either be because provincial ombuds offices’ lack
awareness of the provinces’ obligations in this area, or because Indigenous families do not fit
within their mandated criteria, or may not be aware of, or may not feel comfortable accessing,
this avenue for accountability. In any event, this gap signals the need for some further
accountability mechanisms to support Indigenous children and families vis-a-vis provinces.
Need #7: Investigating and mediating individual complaints about child welfare agencies’
implementation of CFS laws and policies, including C92
Currently, NL, PEI, NB, MB, SK, AB, BC, YK and NU have child advocates offices charged with
oversight of provincial child welfare services. In NS and ON, concerns about the conduct of
child welfare authorities are dealt with by the provincial Ombuds office. In QC, such concerns
are sent to Quebec’s human rights commission.
Public inquiries in MB and BC called for child advocates offices to advocate for Indigenous
parents and children in the child welfare system, and to monitor the actions of the child welfare
authorities.139 The 2019 Final Report of the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered
Indigenous Women and Girls called for the urgent establishment of units with specialized
mandates in relation to Indigenous children and youth within the offices of child advocates in
each province.140 Currently, the extent of prioritization of Indigenous children within child
advocate offices across the country appears to be patchwork. Only MB, AB, PEI, YK and NU
have explicit provisions on Indigenous children and families in their child advocate laws.141 Only
the websites of MB, BC, YK and NU suggest Indigenous issues are a focus of Child Advocate’s
work. Further, some provincial child advocates offices are more limited in the extent of ownmotion or systemic inquiries they can undertake.142
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Particularly with the passage of C92, there is strong need to ensure provincial child welfare
authorities across the country are adhering to the minimum standards in the new federal law,
and to ensure more generally that these authorities are not contributing, through their actions or
inaction, to the overrepresentation of Indigenous children in government care. It is not clear to
us that this is a priority for most provincial child advocates (or ombuds) offices, which suggest
the need for a further accountability mechanism to ensure the needs Indigenous children and
families’ for oversight of child welfare authorities are not falling through the cracks.
Need #8: Powers for enforceable orders against Canada for non-compliance with
Jordan’s Principle, substantive equality and other relevant laws and international
requirements (C-92, DISA, UNDRIP, CRC, etc)
While we believe that having an accountability body to oversee, monitor and make
recommendations to Canada on the provisions of services for Indigenous children and families
is necessary (needs #1-6), we do not believe this is sufficient on its own to fully ensure
accountability conditions under which Canada will make meaningful change.
While there is an important role for oversight and advice in accountability offered by bodies such
as Ombuds and Child Advocates, these are circumstances that warrant stronger measures. In
some countries that have faced extensive problems of political corruption, ombuds or
commissions have been given enforcement powers in some cases.143 While Canada does not
face the challenges to democracy similar to those countries, we do not think it is an
exaggeration to analogize the gravity of these problems to the extent of discrimination that
Indigenous children and families have faced for decades. Canada’s long history of systemic
discrimination in relation to services resulting in the taking of thousands of children – called
“one of the worst possible cases” of racial discrimination seen by the Tribunal144 – as well as the
intransigence the government has shown to change even following the Caring Society 2016
Main Decision, fully convinces us that enforcement powers must be a necessary last resort. As
we stated at the outset, the overrepresentation of Indigenous children in state care and the
federal government’s role in this constitutes one of most serious, ongoing human rights
violations in our country’s history.
That said, we appreciate that it is not common within Canada to provide enforcement powers to
ombuds-like bodies who primarily provide advisory functions.145 Rather, as will be further
developed below, what we envision is a ‘layering’ of accountability mechanisms through having
both a National Indigenous Child and Family Advocate and Tribunal, the former providing
ombuds-like oversight functions and the latter providing adjudication and having enforcement
powers. The Advocate would have the power to investigate the implementation of Jordan’s
Principle and the substantive equality rights of Indigenous children and families’ in relation to
essential services, as well as CFS laws and policies, including C92. In addition to addressing
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systemic and education issues, the Advocate would also assist Indigenous children and families
resolve individual complaints through informal and confidential means. The Tribunal would have
the jurisdiction to adjudicate individual, group, community and Advocate-initiated complaints in
the same areas as noted above. We believe a dedicated Advocate and Tribunal is what will be
most effective to bring real change to the long-standing discrimination and neglect of the needs
of Indigenous children and families in Canada. The Tribunal would enforce Canada’s
substantive equality and statutory human rights obligations under domestic law (human rights
legislation and the Charter), as well as its obligations under C92, DISA, the UN Declaration and
UNDRIPA, as well as other international instruments such as the Convention on the Rights of
the Child. Finally, it will be imperative that the Tribunal have strong remedial powers, including
robust supervisory jurisdiction. Supervisory jurisdiction has been key to the Canadian Human
Rights Tribunal ability to affect change in the Caring Society and something similar to take its
place is necessary for when the Tribunal is no longer seized of the case.
Need #9: Powers for enforceable orders against provinces for non-compliance with
Jordan’s Principle, substantive equality against provinces and relevant laws and
international requirements (C-92, UNDRIP, CRC, etc)
Similar to our conclusion in need #8, and building on our points discussed at needs #6-7, we
believe the history of provincial neglect of Indigenous children and families needs justifies
having a body that can also grant binding orders against the provinces for their failure to respect
their obligations under both domestic and international instruments in relation to the Indigenous
children and families.
Need #10: Formal advocacy for First Nations children, families and communities for
government services and in child welfare matters
Indigenous children and their families experience significant barriers in accessing existing
avenues to hold governments for violations of their rights to services. Barriers can include lack
of awareness of avenues, lack of resources or capacity to advocate on their own behalf, fear of
retaliation, language and literacy challenges, and more. The case of Carolyn and Noah BuffaloJackson, related earlier, shows that even where First Nations parents have a legal education
and influence to advocate for their children, attempting to resolve disputes with Canada can be
very challenging, as well as navigating the Canadian Human Rights Commission system.146
While the Caring Society and its network of pro bono lawyers have been supporting families and
communities to the best of their ability in an ad hoc way and on a shoe-string budget, we believe
there is a strong need for formal, funded advocacy to support Indigenous children and families
in their disputes with both the federal and provincial governments over the provision of services
to children and families, as well as with child welfare agencies in their enforcement of child
welfare laws. Such supports should run the gamut from providing information to navigate the
different avenues for recourse, to filling forms, letter writings and speaking on their behalf, to
See “Buffalo v Canada – My Family’s Fight for the Right for Noah to ride a bus to school,” supra note
119.
146
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pursuing Ombuds, Child Advocate, human rights challenges or judicial review. To our
knowledge, most legal aid plans across the country, except for the Manitoba Public Interest Law
Center, largely do not see their jurisdiction as extending to advocacy for pursuing denials and
delay of services.
We would also see an important role for such advocates to represent parents, care providers
and communities who now have a right to be represented, appear and make submissions in
child welfare proceedings pursuant to the national standards in C92.147 Except for parents,
other care-givers and communities are not generally eligible for representation under most
provincial legal aid plans, and so, without state-funded representation in these matters, their
legal rights under C92 are rendered meaningless. Further, the guarantees of substantive
equality in the exercise of the rights of children, their family members and communities under
C92 suggest a positive obligation on governments to make legal services available (and
Jordan’s Principle provides a framework for determining who pays and reimbursement).
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Part 3: What does effective accountability look like?
Here, we set out and explain those common features we believe are necessary for the
accountability mechanisms to have, and then we identify and explain three accountability
mechanisms we have selected. It bears repeating that what effective accountability looks like is
context-driven. Therefore, the history and needs identified in Part 1 and 2 drive our
recommendations in this Part.
a) External accountability mechanisms
While there can be both internal and external forms of accountability (e.g., mechanisms within
the department versus those arms-length and independent from it),148 our recommendations
focus on external mechanisms. Currently, there are no external non-judicial accountability
mechanisms that apply to the work of ISC and CIRNAC.149 While external accountability
mechanisms, such as Ombud and Child Advocate offices exist within the provinces, it does not
appear that most of these bodies see themselves as having a role in holding provincial
authorities accountable for adequate services delivery to Indigenous children and families.
Our focus on external mechanisms are not intended to discourage Canada, particularly the staff
of ISC, from developing internal mechanisms for accountability, such as staff training, internal
audits, dispute resolution mechanisms, reporting, etc. ISC is already engaging in some of these
activities, and it should continue to do so. Further actions that ISC could be taking include:
●

Creating a Code of Ethics and Network Panel as a framework for funding communitybased youth organizations that would inform the disbursements of any funds that
implicate Indigenous youth, and the co-development of the Indigenous Youth Voice
Government of Canada Fund;150

●

Putting in place internal human rights champions who are responsible for engaging with
service coordinators and Indigenous children, families and communities to review and
evaluate ISC processes, including standing operating procedures and policies, and
advocate for changes to ensure compliance with principles of substantive equality to
those with the authority to make changes;

●

Review all Jordan’s Principle requests, including those with inadequate documentation,
to identify where ISC can reduce demands for documentation to a minimal data set,
particularly for services commonly approved or falling within the “normative standard of
care.'' This may result in greater efficiency for ISC, and possibly lead to two streams of
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claims (i.e. simple or complex; at or above normative standard of care), with
documentation and process requirements that are proportional to the type of claim.151
●

Reverse the onus of who has to establish how the requested service meets the standard
of substantive equality, by requiring ISC staff to identify and give written reasons as to
where and why they believe a specific request does not fall within that standard, prior to
claimants ever being asked to explain how their request falls within this. This still
addresses the issue but takes the burden off individual claimants and acknowledges it is
ISC’s responsibility to deliver services that meet the standard, not individuals to argue
for their own substantive equality to ISC.

●

Create and use confidential release forms, that, with the consent of Indigenous children
and families, give their third party representatives access to information in order to
advocate and support clarification, claims and/or appeals.

●

Fund the advocates or lawyers who are supporting the ad hoc advocacy work of the
Caring Society in the interim.

It is important to note that these actions do not replace the mechanisms we are proposing in this
report. Nonetheless, they could and should be implemented in the interim while these
mechanisms are being established. The long history of interjurisdictional wrangling and neglect
by both Canada and the provinces leading to pervasive underfunding of services to Indigenous
children and families, as well as continued resistance by Canada to implement the Tribunal’s
orders in the last six years, all make it clear to us that arms-length, external accountability
mechanisms are necessary.
b) Legislated mechanisms, not simply created by the executive
To ensure the independence of these external accountability mechanisms, which is crucial for
the same reasons as noted in the preceding section, we believe that these mechanisms must
be legislated by Parliament and not simply be created by the executive.152 Many of the external
accountability mechanisms of the federal government tend to be created by the executive (the
Governor in Council through orders in Council or through regulation). This can severely hamper
the independence and powers of the accountability body. For example, the National Defence
and Canadian Armed Forces Ombudsman, created by the executive, has been critiqued in
several reports for having serious problems with its independence, ability to ensure
confidentiality, ability to serve its constituents, operate effectively and fulfill its mandate.153
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In our conversation with Professor Reif, an expert on human rights accountability mechanisms,
she stressed that for effective independence from the government of the day, legislatures, and
not executives, ought to be the ones to create accountability bodies, appoint their leadership,
oversee the bodies’ functions, and be the government entity receiving reports from the body.154
Reif noted this has been a challenge for the federal government, pointing out that even the
Canadian Human Rights Commission is not entirely independent from government, since its
Executive Director is appointed by the Governor in Council. We agree with the Caring Society
that it would be important for the selection of the leaders of our proposed accountability
mechanisms to be arms-length from the executive. There are precedents of how this can
work.155
As will be seen further below, we believe the three interconnected mechanisms we propose
could be legislated within the same statute.
c) Mechanism with specific mandates relating to Indigenous children and families
There have been recent calls for the creation of accountability mechanisms on Indigenous
issues that could potentially serve as accountability mechanisms to address the accountability
needs identified in this report. However, we believe that the unparallelled gravity and longevity
of the ongoing substantive equality and statutory human rights violations of Indigenous children
and families requires the creation of mechanisms with specific mandates in relation to
Indigenous children and families.156
The 2015 Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission recommended the creation of a
National Council for Reconciliation to monitor, evaluate and report annually on Canada’s
progress on reconciliation, including implementation of the calls to action.157 In Budget 2019,
Canada announced $126.5 million in fiscal year 2020 to 2021 to establish a National Council for
Reconciliation and endow it with initial operating capital.158 Despite the TRC containing five
calls to action on child welfare, our concern would be that the focus of the Nation Council on
154
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Reconciliation would likely be too diffuse to provide the necessary attention to the accountability
needs identified in Part 2. Further, it’s not clear what kind of investigation, recommendation or
enforcement powers, if any, a National Council would have, thus it likely would lack sufficient
powers to be effective in the circumstances.
The 2019 Final Report of the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women
and Girls called for the creation of both a National Child and Youth Commissioner to strengthen
the framework of accountability for the rights of Indigenous children in Canada, as well as
National Indigenous and Human Rights Ombudsperson and a National Indigenous and Human
Rights Tribunal.159 The proposed scope and jurisdiction of these mechanisms by the National
Inquiry was broad, suggesting these mechanisms could be designed to possess effective
powers to hold governments accountable in the area of child welfare, Jordan’s Principle and
services for Indigenous children and families. Canada’s June 2021 MMIWG National Action
Plan has partly taken up this recommendation, identifying the creation of “an oversight body
which represents the interests of families, survivors, and Indigenous communities by
investigating and addressing mal-administration or a violation of rights'' as a short-term priority
that it will begin to implement.160 This scope, however, appears focused on the interests of the
families and communities of missing and murdered Indigenous women and girls. It therefore
would not be sufficient to address the accountability needs identified in Part 2.
In June 2020, Senator Rosemary Moodie introduced Bill S-217, An Act to establish the Office of
Commissioner for Children and Youth in Canada (which died on the order paper when the
election was called in the summer of 2021).161 The bill proposed the creation of an independent
Commissioner to serve children and youth in Canada to promote, monitor and report on
Canada’s implementation of its obligation to advance the rights of children and youth, focusing
on the best interests of the child. The bill was criticized by the Caring Society and other
Indigenous advocates, as well as some First Nation Senators, for not being sufficiently focused
on the needs of Indigenous children.162 The bill provided, but did not mandate, the creation of
an Assistant Commissioner on First Nations, Inuit and Metis children and youth matters. It also
did not contemplate the Commissioner having any oversight and enforcement over legislation
like C92 and DISA, or implementation by Canada of Jordan’s Principle or substantive equality.
A report from the Assembly of Seven Generations also concluded that Bill S-217 did not meet
Indigenous youth needs around accountability. The report suggests that Indigenous youth and
children seemed to be an afterthought in the Bill. Other concerns raised include Bill S-217
providing the Commissioner insufficient powers to hold governments accountable. The
Assembly of Seven Generations’ report indicated that Indigenous youth want to have ongoing
159
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conversations about accountability: regional conversations and to establish an ongoing network
to share best practices and critical discussions on the topic of accountability.163 On this point,
the literature is clear that effective accountability mechanisms geared at children should be child
and youth-informed.164
We agree with the Assembly of Seven Generations’ report that, to address the long and ongoing
history of discrimination faced by Indigenous children and families in Canada, effective
accountability mechanisms have to be specifically focused on them. While there may be a need
for a federal children’s commission focused on the needs of other children (and our
recommendations are not intended to dissuade Canada from taking other action on this front),
no other group of children have been so detrimentally affected by Canada’s exercise of
jurisdiction over them. The context justifies an Indigenous-specific national child and family
commissioner (or advocate).
d) Mechanisms with powers over all Indigenous children
We believe that effective accountability mechanisms must be focused on all Indigenous children
and families, including First Nations (status and non-status), as well as Métis, and Inuit. While
the FNFCS Program and the Caring Society decision focused on First Nations children (e.g.,
with Indian status) on reserve, we do not think the accountability needs discussed in this report
are limited to status First Nations children and families on reserve.
The exclusion of non-status, Metis and Inuit children from the FNCFS program is a by-product
of the same jurisdictional wrangling and discrimination that has preoccupied the federal and
provincial governments for over 70 years. Canada did not discriminate between groups when it
came to residential schools: Inuit and Metis children were forced to attend along with First
Nations children.165 However, after World War 2, Canada only begrudgingly accepted to
provide services on reserves after much public pressure, and then provided inadequate services
to First Nations.166 Similarly, the provinces only begrudgingly provided services to Metis, nonstatus and off-reserve First Nations because Canada refused to, and were often similarly as
neglectful as Canada in the delivery of services to these groups.167 Due to a ruling from the
163
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Supreme Court of Canada, the federal government was eventually forced to provide services to
the Inuit, and then chose to do without a legislative framework and inadequately.168
In our view, only recommending accountability mechanisms for status First Nations children and
families on reserve would be akin to reproducing the same jurisdictional neglect by Canada and
the provinces that has been harming Indigenous children and families for decades. The
Assembly of Seven Generations also acknowledged problems with the exclusion of Métis
children from Jordan’s Principle and Inuit Children First Initiative services.169 Furthermore,
decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada have now clearly confirmed that the federal
jurisdiction over “Indians” includes First Nations, both status and non-status, Metis and Inuit
peoples.170 Due to ongoing discrimination through the second-generation cut-off rule in the
Indian Act, since 1985, more and more First Nations are without status.171 Recently Canada
seems to have accepted its jurisdiction in relation to all three groups: DISA recognizes ISC’s
jurisdiction in relation to all three groups, and C92 extends the protections in the act to all
Indigenous peoples.172 Further, even the Tribunal in Caring Society has extended the protection
of Jordan’s Principle beyond status First Nations children living on reserve.173 For all these
reasons, we strongly feel that accountability should be extended to all Indigenous children and
families.
We feel such an inclusive approach is necessary to ensure Indigenous children do not fall
through jurisdictional cracks in the future. There are precedents in situations involving the
human rights complaints of a subgroup of a larger equity-seeking group, where human rights
tribunals have issued broader, more inclusive remedies to the larger equity-seeking group in
order to effectively prevent future discrimination. For example, in the case of discrimination on
the basis of mobility rights in accessing voting stations, the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal
ordered the respondent, Elections Canada, to engage in greater consultation with voters with
disabilities and disability groups (not just those with mobility disabilities) in order to prevent
similar discriminatory practices in the future.174 In another case involving discrimination on the
basis of a person identifying as pangender for not having the ability to properly self-identify their
gender on the provincial birth certificates, a Manitoba human rights panel ordered the
government to revise its criteria for changing sex designation to include recognition of nonbinary sex designations (not just for pangender peoples only).175 Such an inclusive approach
would prevent similar complaints of discrimination from other categories of non-binary persons
in the future.

https://www.unicef.ca/sites/default/files/imce_uploads/DISCOVER/OUR%20WORK/ADVOCACY/DOMES
TIC/POLICY%20ADVOCACY/DOCS/Leaving%20no%20child%20behind%2009.pdf
168
See Reference as to whether "Indians" includes in s. 91 (24) of the B.N.A. Act includes Eskimo in
habitants of the Province of Quebec, [1939] SCR 104.
169
Assembly of Seven Generations, supra note 7 at 15, graphic image.
170
Daniels v. Canada (Indian Affairs and Northern Development), 2016 SCC 12.
171
Stewart Clatworthy, The Changing Demography of First Nations Populations: Impacts of the
1985 Indian Act Amendment to the Rules Governing Indian Registration. Winnipeg: Four Directions
Project Consultants, 2007.
172
Department of Indigenous Services Act, SC 2019, c 29, s 336 at s 2; and An Act respecting First
Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, supra note 98 s 2.
173
See 2019 CHRT 7 (interim) and 2020 CHRT 36.
174
Hughes v. Elections Canada, 2010 CHRT 4 at paras 79-80.
175
T.A. v Manitoba (Justice), 2019 MBHR 12 at para 71.

54

Doing Better: Jordan’s Principle Accountability Mechanisms Report

Inclusive is different from pan-Indigenous. Instead of treating all Indigenous peoples identically,
as a pan-Indigenous approach seeks to do, an inclusive approach, while recognizing all
Indigenous peoples are worthy of human rights protection, acknowledges there can be
differences between different sub-groups that need to be accommodated. An inclusive
approach does not prevent a distinctions-based approach when necessary or appropriate. For
example, distinctions based on unique needs and the diverse legal traditions among Indigenous
peoples may be appropriate to achieve equitable outcomes.
e) Mechanisms that bypass jurisdictional wrangling
Further developing a theme from the last section, we believe that effective accountability in the
circumstances must challenge the conventional jurisdictional boundaries the federal and
provincial governments have set for themselves. These are the same jurisdictional boundaries
that have facilitated decades of neglect of the needs of Indigenous children and families.
In other words, we do not think it will be effective if the jurisdiction of a federal accountability
body over Indigenous children and families is solely focused on the conduct of federal
authorities, leaving the conduct of provincial authorities in relation to Indigenous children and
families to provincial accountability bodies. This will stymie robust oversight, allowing the needs
of some Indigenous children and families to fall through the cracks as they have for decades.
They need to be addressed together, since it is the combined force of neglect, denials and
delays from both the federal and provincial governments that is continuing to harm Indigenous
children and families. The fact is that various federal and provincial actors operate within the
complex matrix of essential service delivery and child welfare enforcement that affect the wellbeing of Indigenous children and families. Trying to separate out issues to be dealt with by
different federal and provincial accountability mechanisms will only result in delays and denials
of services that harm Indigenous children and families.
This issue can be illustrated by the example of an Indigenous child seeking to challenge a
denial of the same service by both Canada and their home province as violating their right to
substantive equality and Jordan’s Principle. Under current law, it would be impossible for the
child to bring a discrimination complaint against Canada and the province in the same forum.
She would have to bring a complaint against Canada to the Canadian Human Rights
Commission, and bring another complaint against the province to her provincial human rights
commission.176 She would face the same issue if she sought to judicially review the decisions of
Canada and the province; Canada would have to be sued in Federal Court and the province
sued in her provincial superior court.177 These scenarios present risks of inconsistent legal
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rulings, increased chances of appeals, delays and increased costs.178 All of which is not in
keeping with the spirit of Jordan’s Principle that jurisdictional wrangling should not delay timely
access to services by Indigenous children. As one of the pro bono lawyers for the Caring
Society aptly put it: “Currently in Canada, there is a Jordan Principle problem with trying to
vindicate Jordan’s Principle.”179 Such a result is unacceptable in light of the long history of
discrimination, delay and denial faced by Indigenous children and families. It is also
unnecessary.
Under its jurisdiction under s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1982, the federal government has
the power to legislate in relation to Indigenous peoples in areas that would otherwise be
regarded as areas of provincial jurisdiction. Such legislation can have incidental impacts on
provinces.180 Even legislative provisions that on their face encroach on provincial powers can
be upheld so long as they are necessary to the effective functioning of the legislation.181 This is
all to say that Canada can pass legislation that would give an accountability body the power to
investigate as well as make binding orders in relation to provincial authorities’ actions in relation
to Indigenous children and families. Historically, Canada has been reluctant to use its
legislative powers to provide protection to Indigenous peoples from the provinces.182 However,
such action is in keeping with Canada’s fiduciary and treaty obligations to Indigenous peoples,
the Honour of the Crown and reconciliation.183 With C92, however, Canada turned a page on
that history by passing a federal law that has incidental impacts on the provincial powers over
child welfare by legislating minimum standards. The Quebec Court of Appeal had no difficulty in
concluding that this was within Canada’s constitutional jurisdiction to legislate in relation to
Indigenous people.184 Canada did so because it recognized that the crisis of overrepresentation
of Indigenous children in state care required such action.185 The same reasoning applies in the
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case of passing effective accountability mechanisms in the circumstances, and this is supported
in legal scholarship.186 There is also precedent for this internationally.187
f) Recommendations for Specific Accountability Mechanisms
We have identified 3 specific accountability mechanisms which could stand alone, but would
most effectively safeguard the needs of Indigenous children and families if all 3 were enacted as
interconnected mechanisms.
Based on the accountability needs identified in Part 2, and the principles we outlined above, we
have identified three mechanisms that we believe will effectively address the government
conduct that has contributed to the overrepresentation of Indigenous children in state care for
decades. We believe that all 3 are necessary to achieve true accountability. Any of these three
mechanisms, individually, could stand alone and would serve to provide greater protection of
the rights of Indigenous children and families from the discrimination found in the Caring Society
case by improving government accountability. However, none are sufficient, on their own, to
address all of the identified accountability needs. Therefore, combining all three mechanisms
would be the most effective way of preventing discrimination from continuing or re-emerging in
the future.
First, we identify the mechanism and the accountability needs each would address. Following
this, we explain our rationales for each mechanism, why we ruled out some other options, and
what should be included in these mechanisms.
Note that we are not attempting to be exhaustive in setting out details for the mechanisms we
propose. We believe there are several details about the proposed Advocate’s Office and
Tribunal, such as composition, qualifications, terms, staff, etc., that ought to be determined in
future discussions and collaboration with Indigenous groups, including Indigenous children and
youth, the Caring Society and the pro bono lawyers who have been supporting them. That said,
when it comes to appointment criteria and the selection process, we agree with comments
received from the Caring Society that it should be a priority for staff of these bodies to be
diverse, knowledgeable about human rights and Indigenous child welfare issues, selected in a
way that ensures their independence from the government, and for such details to be set out in
the enabling legislation.188
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Our mandate did not include drafting of the enabling legislation for these mechanisms, though
we have given some ideas for precedent clauses in what follows. These are based on our
review of different child advocates and human rights commissions laws in the county. However,
we suggest that in the actual development of the enabling legislation, further expert advice be
sought to recommend specific statutory language.
Accountability Mechanism 1:

National Indigenous Child and Family Advocate
Need #1: Oversight of Canada’s implementation of Jordan’s Principle
Need #2: Oversight of Canada’s long-term reform of child welfare, including C92
implementation
Need #3: Oversight Canada’s implementation of substantive equality in relation to all services
impacting on Indigenous Children and Families
Need #4: Oversight of Federal-Provincial cooperation in servicing Indigenous Children and
Families
Need #5: Ongoing education for federal and provincial government actors involved in child
welfare services
Need #6: Oversight of provincial governments implementation of substantive equality in
relation to all services impacting on Indigenous Children and Families
Need #7: Oversight of child provincial welfare agencies, including their implementation of C92

Accountability Mechanism 2:

National Indigenous Child and Family Tribunal
Need #8: Enforce orders against Canada for non-compliance with Jordan’s Principle,
substantive equality and other relevant laws and international requirements (C-92, DISA,
UNDRIP, CRC, etc)
Need #9: Enforce orders against provinces for non-compliance with Jordan’s Principle,
substantive equality against provinces and relevant laws and international requirements (C92, UNDRIP, CRC, etc)
Accountability Mechanism 3:
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National Legal Services for Indigenous Children and Families
Need #10: Formal advocacy for Indigenous children, families and communities for government
services and in child welfare matters

(1) A National Indigenous Child and Family Advocate
The body that we feel would be most effective at addressing accountability needs #1-7 is a
national Indigenous child and family advocate. Effectively, this would be based on the ombuds
model of a child and youth advocate office, but also with specific jurisdiction to oversee
governments’ delivery of services to Indigenous children and families in accordance with
Jordan’s Principle, their right to substantive equality in statutory human rights instruments and
other relevant laws and international requirements (C-92, DISA, UNDRIP, CRC, etc). This is
because of the dual need for such a body to take a child and family centered approach on the
one hand, and to also apply a substantive equality lens informed by both domestic and
international human rights principles. The Advocate would also oversee governments’
implementation of child welfare legislation and policy in relation to Indigenous children and
families.
In discussions with ISC and the Caring Society early on in this project, the specific model of an
ombudsperson was of interest. However, as we got further into our research, we reached the
conclusion that the ‘classic’ ombuds model of it would not have the tools and powers necessary
to address the accountability needs we have identified in this report. Most classic ombuds
offices in Canada focus mainly on the function of a government’s administrative systems and
procedures, and generally do not consider matters from a human rights lens, which is
imperative in the circumstances. Furthermore, most ombuds in Canada also have limited
powers to make systemic inquiries, and they generally do not have a mandate for education.
Nor do they generally have requirements to take a child-centered approach. The federal
government has a number of specific ombuds, some are created pursuant to executive power.
These have received critiques for lacking sufficient independence from the government and
powers to make effective change.189 In the circumstances, we do not think a classic ombuds is
a sufficiently robust model, and this is why we recommend a child advocate (a form of a
thematic ombuds).
In an earlier draft, we had called this mechanism a ‘commission’ as opposed to an ‘advocate.’
There is no magic in the name. As we note in our ‘Primer on Accountability Mechanisms,’ the
concepts are largely synonymous, however, advocates usually have a more active role in
defending the rights of children and youth than commissions/thematic ombuds offices might,
given that children’s rights are at stake. ‘Advocate’ more clearly also distinguishes this office
from a human rights commission with a role in screening complaints, which, based on feedback
we received from the Caring Society, is a concern about using ‘commission.’ We had always
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intended that this mechanism would be involved in ‘soft advocacy’ by assisting Indigenous
children and families resolve individual complaints through informal and confidential means.
Children advocate office’s are typically staffed with trained social workers or other helping
professionals who can intervene on children and youth’ behalf within the system and help
navigate processes.
Below, we set out the functions and powers we believe the Advocate should have in order to be
effective.
Mandate
The mandate of the Advocate ought to reflect accountability needs #1-7, and it should
specifically identify the assessment standards upon which the Advocate would scrutinize the
conduct of governments. For both the federal and provincial governments this would include
Jordan’s Principle and substantive equality (protected under each government’s human rights
legislation and the Charter), C-92 and international instruments such as United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the Conventions with Rights of the Child, and
the Convention of Rights of Persons with Disabilities. On top of this, ISC’s conduct should also
be assessed for compliance with its enabling statute, DISA. Language in the enabling legislation
should convey that these instruments set the minimum standards that government decisionmakers are expected to comply with in all circumstances. The mandates in PEI and Ontario’s
2007 Child and Youth Advocate law provide a robust mandate for their advocate and this could
be drawn upon for inspiration.190
Consistent with various human rights statutes, the mandate should also explicitly mention the
Advocate’s role to protect Indigenous children and families’ right to substantive equality and
statutory human rights, particularly in the delivery of government services. The protected
grounds from discrimination should include all those listed in the Canadian Human Rights Act,
but it will also be important particularize Indigenous origin (which is not mentioned in the CHRA
but is viewed as included within ‘ethnicity’), as well as the various subsets of Indigenous
characteristics that government distinctions have often been based upon, such as being nonstatus, living off-reserve, being Inuit, being Metis, etc., in order to ensure that any actions based
on such distinctions suggests prima facie discrimination.
Jurisdiction
As we have said before, when it comes to jurisdiction, the Advocate ought to be able to oversee
not just the actions of the federal government, but also provincial governments in the delivery of
services to Indigenous children and families, as well as oversee the actions of child welfare
agencies. This would include FNCFS Agencies, as well as other agencies dedicated to
providing services to Indigenous groups (Métis, Inuit and off-reserve First Nations), all of whom
currently exercise jurisdiction delegated from the provinces. Our interest in overseeing
190
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delegated Indigenous child welfare agencies lies mainly in the fact that such investigations will
likely reveal problems with federal and provincial legal or funding frameworks that need to be
addressed.
The question of whether the Advocate should oversee the child welfare systems of selfgoverning Indigenous Governing Bodies as these grow under C92 is more challenging. Of
course, accountability of self-governing Indigenous groups is important, but accountability
models should not be unilaterally imposed on Indigenous governing bodies. Moreover, the
history reviewed in Part 1 reveals that the need for accountability at this time arises from the
actions and inactions by federal and provincial governments, not Indigenous governing bodies.
For this reason, we do not think the jurisdiction of the Advocate should automatically include
jurisdiction over Indigenous governing bodies that become self-governing over child and family
services. Recognizing the right to self-determination, an Indigenous governing body should be
given the choice to opt-in to the accountability framework offered by the Advocate191, or be left
to develop its own.
On the question of the wisdom of duplicating some of the functions carried out by existing
accountability bodies, as addressed in Part 1, we know that many provincial governments
continue to refuse many services to Indigenous peoples despite Jordan’s Principle, and that
many actors within provincial child welfare systems are not aware of, and not adhering to the
minimum standards in C92. It does not seem that the majority of provincial child advocates,
ombuds or human rights commissions are holding provincial authorities sufficiently accountable
when it comes to their obligations to Indigenous children and families. The Canadian Human
Rights Commission is not mandated to focus on Indigenous child and family issues, nor to take
a child-centered approach that employs ‘soft advocacy’--that is, working with governments to
resolve individual complaints through informal and confidential means.192 Moreover, as noted in
section 3(e) above, both the federal human rights commission and provincial accountability
bodies lack the jurisdiction to consider complaints that involve both federal and provincial
refusals of a service at once.
There is precedent in the non-Indigenous context for the creation of a federal accountability
body that may duplicate some of the functions of an existing provincial accountability body, and
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the Supreme Court had no issue with the prospect of these bodies operating concurrently.193
Further, the legislation could be drafted such that, if another accountability body is effectively
responding to a matter, the Advocate may decline to exercise jurisdiction.194 The Advocate
could also be mandated to provide outreach, education and coordination with provincial
ombuds, child advocate and human rights commission to assist in their attempts to address
matters relating to Indigenous children and families.
Types of investigation
All child advocates, ombuds and human rights commissions have the power to investigate
individual complaints relating to their areas of jurisdiction. There is clearly a need for this in the
context of the services provided by Canada and provinces to Indigenous children and families.
We could also foresee individual complaints including group or community complaints,
especially in relation to funding issues relating to both Jordan’s Principle, as well as funding
under C92. Jurisdiction over group complaints is made explicit in some accountability
legislation, and we recommend similarly in the proposed Advocate legislation.195 It would be
best if the law clarified that groups can include Indigenous collectives, such as communities,
Bands, tribal councils, and organizations.
Many accountability bodies also have the power to initiate own-motion investigations into
matters, and we recommend this for the proposed Advocate. We also recommend that the
statute provide clear language that the Advocate has the power to undertake systemic
investigations, including the powers to carry out studies and research in support of systemic
inquiries, as in the case of some existing statutes.196 Related to systemic inquiries, a power to
carry out studies and research on any relevant question under the advocate’s jurisdiction, such
as found in Quebec’s child advocate laws, is important to specify.197 The power to engage any
persons having technical or specialized knowledge of any matter relating to the work of the
Advocate’s Officer to advise and assist the Advocate, such as found in the Official Languages
Act, would further assist the proposed Advocate in making systemic inquiries.198

Multiple Access Ltd. v. McCutcheon, [1982] 2 SCR 161, involving a federal and Ontario’s securities
regulatory. The Court held that duplication of legislative regimes in areas of concurrent jurisdiction
(double aspect) was acceptable, so long as there was no conflict or ‘incompatibility’ between the statutes,
and this would be conceived of narrowly. In true cases of incompatibility, however, the federal legislation
would be paramount.
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Investigative powers
The Advocate should have robust investigative powers to collect necessary information to
effectively respond to the different types of complaints (individual, group, own-motion and
systemic). In particular, we recommend that the Advocate have investigative powers similar to
those of human rights commissions, including powers to make oral or written inquiries, demand
the production of documents or records, and search any premises after applying for a warrant,
and apply for enforcement of orders.199 The investigative powers in Senator Moodie’s proposed
Bill S-217 would have given the proposed Commission all the powers of a commissioner
appointed under Part II of the Inquiries Act, which covers most of the investigative powers
above, so this may be a precedent worth considering.200
In terms of collection of data and systemic oversight of Canada’s implementation of Jordan’s
Principle and CHRT’s order to reform FNCFS, we agree with the Caring Society that it would be
important to specify in the enabling legislation some types of data that it would be mandatory for
the Advocate to collect and analyze. For example, this might include:
●
●
●
●
●
●
●

●
●
●

Jordan’s Principle decision-makers approval and denial rates, as well as number of
requests deemed ‘submitted with insufficient information’.
Jordan’s Principle decision-makers turn-around times.
Jordan’s Principle request by regions/communities.
Disaggregated data by sub-group of Jordan’s Principle requests by age, gender,
disability as well as service/product/program types.201
Identify gaps in services being addressed through Jordan’s Principle.
identify subgroups that are underrepresented in Jordan’s Principle requests.
The amount of funding being provided per capita through Jordan’s Principle, and the
variation in funding levels across provinces/territories and remote/rural/urban
communities.
Jordan’s Principle appeal approval and denial rates.
Jordan’s Principle appeal turn-around times.
Disaggregated data of complaints brought to the Advocate and Tribunal.

Further mandatory areas of data collection could be identified in discussions and collaboration
with Indigenous groups, lawyers and experts in the area. Note that such a mandatory list
should not preclude the Advocate from collecting other data they view as important to fulfilling
their mandate, or to investigate specific complaints, and the legislation should also be clear on
that.
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We also agree with the Caring Society that, for the purposes of systemic oversight, there is
value in listing issues or events that would create an obligation on provincial and federal
government departments to report to the Advocate that would in turn trigger mandatory
investigations by the Advocate. While this list is not exhaustive, examples of potential areas that
could trigger investigations include:
●
●
●
●

Jordan’s Principle decision-makers with low approval rates.
Jordan’s Principle decision-makers with slow turnaround times.
Jordan’s Principle regions/communities with high and low request rates.
Situations where there are a large number of requests from members of groups or for a
specific service.

Such a list would benefit from further discussions and collaboration with Indigenous groups,
lawyers and experts in the area.
Like with the powers of provincial child advocates, the Advocate should also be mandated to
meet with children and youth and ensure their voices are heard in the investigation process.
Helpful provisions to this effect are included in Newfoundland’s Child and Youth Advocate Act,
which calls for the Advocate to meet with children and youth and ensure their participation in
decisions regarding services.202
We see real value-added in the model of a Child Advocate for engaging in ‘soft advocacy’ on
behalf of Indigenous children and families. Advocate Offices employ trained social workers or
other helping professionals who can intervene with government departments and agencies on
behalf on children and youth and attempt to informally resolve their complaints.Thus,
investigations should take place confidentially, as they do with child advocates and federal
legislated ombuds,203 in order to foster greater cooperation by government parties.204
Confidentiality supports professionalism and diligence as it creates better access to information
and gains the respect of senior government officials, which leads to opportunities for quick
resolutions.205 Further, confidentiality strengthens accessibility to the public,206 independence,207
trust, and confidence as well as protects from fears of reprisal.208 The provisions in the (now
repealed) Ontario Provincial Advocate for Children and Youth Act on confidentiality and privacy
are a useful precedent to look to. However, this does not prevent public reporting by the
Advocate, which we believe will be a crucial function of the Advocate in some cases, as we
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discuss below. In the Ontario legislation, for example, the individual’s information can only be
disclosed in a public report with consent, or otherwise anonymized.209
The proposed Advocate may require tools to encourage reporting of concerns by public
servants and others and discourage any form of retaliation. The Official Languages Act
contains a provision allowing the Commissioner to make a report to the Treasury Board of any
belief of an individual being threatened, intimidated or discriminated against for making a
complaint or giving evidence or assisting in an investigation under the Act.210 The Canadian
Human Rights Act also prohibits any form of retaliation and treats it as a form of discrimination
that can be subject to a compensation order by the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal.211 We
believe that these sorts of protection against discrimination must be included in legislation for
the proposed Advocate.212
Remedial powers
Commissions and child advocates do not typically possess remedial powers to make
enforcement orders against government actors. By not giving these bodies enforcement
powers, this allows them to instead investigate and seek to provide advice and
recommendations to the government. The rationale is this will make government actors more
amenable to cooperating and working with these bodies. We agree this should be the main
function of the Advocate, however, as noted earlier in discussion of Need #8, this is why we are
also recommending the creation of a Tribunal that can adjudicate matters when persuasion and
advice are ineffective, as discussed further below.
The objective of the Advocate in cases of individual and group complaints should be to facilitate
resolution, and like human rights commission and other child advocates, through informal and
confidential means. Such methods for resolving disputes should draw on Indigenous laws and
dispute resolution processes where possible. If complaints cannot be resolved internally,
individuals or groups are free to pursue other modes of resolutions, including going to the
proposed new Tribunal (or to existing methods for dispute resolution). We do not intend the
Advocate’s Office to ‘gate-keep’ individuals’ or groups’ access to the Tribunal or other forums.
Typically, accessing options of dispute resolution through ombuds-functions does not prevent
people from accessing other forums, and we do not intend to limit peoples’ options with this
mechanism. It is our hope that an individual or group might start with the Advocate to seek
informal resolution or, at the least, obtain information to navigate their options, and possibly be
connected with legal support if necessary (we explain this further below with our third
mechanism, National Legal Services for Indigenous Children and Families). In other words, we
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see the Advocate as providing a “one stop shop” that can support Indigenous children, youth
and their families in navigating the different accountability mechanisms that exist. Essential, we
envision the Advocate receiving complaints and, based on its knowledge and experience,
quickly assessing whether a complaint could be handled based on its relationships with the
government actors (through ‘soft advocacy’) or, if the complaint is more complex or beyond their
soft advocacy abilities, connecting the complainant with legal counsel to advise them on their
options, including going to the Tribunal. The Advocate as a ‘one stop shop’ can help coordinate
and ensure complaints are handled efficiently, as well as ensure that the Tribunal is not
overwhelmed with complaints that could be more quickly handled through the soft advocacy.
The proposed Advocate would also have similar powers to provincial child advocates to make
recommendations to the government. For example, Saskatchewan’s child advocate can make
recommendations on any matter concerning services provided to a child or group of children by
the government, as well as on “any matter relating to the interests and well-being of children or
youths who receive services from [the government].”213 While such wide-discretion to make
orders is important, it would be helpful for the enabling legislation to list examples of the types of
recommendations the Advocate can make. For example,
● When data or investigations reveal bias in policies, process or staff members,
recommendations for training or other corrective measures.
● Recommendations for government actors to take proactive measures, such as steps to
ensure that Indigenous children and families are aware of their rights.
● Recommend policy or process changes to address systemic gaps or inequities, for
example, driving a high level of Jordan’s Principle requests.
● Recommend a comprehensive solution to avoid the case-by-case or a “projectification”
approach to Jordan’s Principle.
Such a list would not be intended to limit what the Advocate can recommend, but to allow
Advocate staff, as well as government staff subject to Advocate oversight, to appreciate the
Advocate’s role and powers.
Further, if an investigation under the Advocate’s jurisdiction reveals wrongdoing by a
government actor (e.g., acting contrary to law, unreasonably, unjustly or based on a mistake of
law or fact), we believe it would be important for the enabling legislation to specify, like in
Saskatchewan, that the Advocate must report to the wrongdoing to the responsible minister or
government service provider and may make recommendations that the Advocate considers
appropriate.214 The Advocate can also request the government entity who received the
recommendation to provide notice within a specified time of the steps that it has taken to or
propose action to give effect to the recommendation. If, within a reasonable time of the
recommendation, no action is taken that seems to the Advocate to be adequate or appropriate,
the Advocate may submit a report of the matter to the Cabinet, as well as mention the report in
its annual report to the Legislative Assembly.215 A very similar approach is found in Nunavut’s
Saskatchewan’s Advocate for Children and Youth Act, supra note 195 at ss 14(2)(d) and (3)(b).
Ibid at s 28.
215
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Children and Youth Act, except that a report shall also “ include a description of the application,
use or incorporation of Inuit culture and Inuit societal values in relation to the conduct of the
review.”216 The federal Official Language Commissioner also has impressive escalation powers
where its recommendations are not acted upon. If, after a reasonable time, the federal
institution concerned has not acted on its recommendation, the Commissioner may transmit its
report to Cabinet, following which, if no adequate and reasonable response is forthcoming in a
reasonable time, the Commissioner may report to Parliament.217 If no action is taken, the
Commissioner can apply to Federal Court for remedy in relation to a complaint under the Official
Languages Act with consent of the complainant.218 We believe it would be important for the
Advocate to have similar escalation powers up to Parliament, as well as to take issues to the
proposed new Tribunal.
Beyond reports on specific complaints, human rights commissions and child advocates will
normally have annual reporting requirements to the legislative branch on their activities for the
year.219 However, they are also empowered to make other or special reports commenting on
any matter within the scope of its powers that they deem appropriate.220 Finally, in addition to
referring complaints to the federal court, the Official Language Commissioner also has the
power to seek leave to intervene in any adjudicative proceedings relating to the status or use of
English or French.221 We believe these would all be important powers in the toolbox of the
Advocate we are proposing.
Education
Human rights commissions and child advocates typically have specified powers to educate the
public. Nova Scotia’s human rights legislation calls on its commission to “develop a program of
public information and education in the field of human rights.” Alberta’s child advocate law
empowers its advocate to “promote the rights, interests, and well-being of children through
public education.”222
We believe that the proposed Advocate should have a significant mandate to promote human
rights, particularly the right to substantive equality and Jordan’s Principle, of Indigenous children
and families, as well as their interests and well-being. We also believe the Advocate should
more specifically have a mandate to educate both federal and provincial civil servants in these
areas, as well as those other professionals who play a role in child welfare matters (judges,
legal aid lawyers, etc.), including their obligation in relation to C92. The Advocate could also
216
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play a ‘knowledge mobilization’ role in terms of ensuring that standards and practices are
consistently applied/understood throughout the various jurisdiction and country, and act as a
resource for Indigenous nations and communities to facilitate learning from each other.
Other important provisions
Senator Moodie’s proposed Bill S-217 included provisions in the mandate of the Commissioner
to promote the collective rights of Indigenous peoples, encourage maintenance of connections
to culture, families, lands, waters, language, songs and stories, as well as encourage the
implementation of Indigenous laws.223 It would be worthwhile to emulate such provisions in
legislation for the Advocate we are proposing. However, any Indigenous Process designed for
accountability purposes needs to recognize the diverse legal traditions among Indigenous
Nations.
The Yukon Child and Youth Advocate Act includes provisions stipulating that the Advocate
should have knowledge of First Nations culture, traditions and beliefs, as well as knowledge
about child and youth development and disabilities affecting children and youth.224 A similar
provision can be found regarding the Advocate’s knowledge of Inuit culture in Nunavut’s Act.225
Alberta’s child advocate legislation requires the child advocate to maintain a roster of
Indigenous, Métis, and Inuit advisors.226
(2) A National Indigenous Child and Family Tribunal
The Advocate we propose above will provide badly needed oversight over the federal and
provincial governments and play an essential role in safeguarding the rights of Indigenous
children and families. However, as important as it is, given that government intransigence on
services for Indigenous children and families is an ongoing problem, the Advocate will be
ineffective if its recommendations on individual and systemic discrimination are only ever
advisory without the possibility of being enforced through binding orders on governments.
In the choice between escalation by the Advocate to courts (which is the option in the case of
the Official Languages Commissioner227) versus specialized tribunal, in the circumstances, we
believe a specialized tribunal with the ability to have more informal procedures and rules around
evidence, as well as more robust remedial powers, is preferable. Courts in Canada do not have
the power to consider substantive equality and statutory human rights violations.228 At best,
they can consider violation of s. 15 of the Charter against government authorities in the context
of a judicial review. In judicial review, the conduct of governments is most often assessed on
the basis of reasonableness in accordance with the government authorities’ statutory
223
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objectives.229 The nature of these proceedings often results in significant deference shown to
governments. Further, the lack of legislative frameworks in the context of services to
Indigenous peoples can further up the level of deference courts will show the government.230
For all these reasons, we believe the creation of a specialized tribunal is important and would be
the optimal venue to hear matters relating to Indigenous children and families. As noted earlier,
however, we do not intend to limit individual or group complainants to the Tribunal and think
they should be able to choose between it and existing forums. Below, we suggest ways to
improve access to justice in existing forums. Given the long history of non-existent or ineffective
options, we believe Indigenous children and families would benefit from more avenues for
vindicating their rights to substantive equality, not less.
The Tribunal’s jurisdiction would be in relation to the same laws falling within the Advocate’s
mandate. While we generally recommend a Tribunal that is focused on Indigenous Child and
Family issues, there has been recommendations and ongoing advocacy for a broader National
Indigenous and Human Rights Tribunal that can adjudicate the gamut of disputes between
Indigenous peoples and governments based on their Aboriginal rights and human rights,
including all those rights protected under the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples.231 While we feel strongly that the proposed Advocate should be focused
specifically on Indigenous children and family issues, we are less concerned about the
complaints from the Advocate going to a Tribunal with broader jurisdiction, so long as the
Tribunal is focused only on Indigenous matters, can bind both the provinces and governments,
and has a sufficiently flexible process and robust remedies. Further, it is likely that a Tribunal
that can provide broad remedies in all areas of the Crown-Indigenous relationship will avoid any
potential jurisdictional gaps.232
In section 3(e), we explained our reasoning for why using the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal
would not be an effective forum to adjudicate the issue we have identified in this report, since it
cannot hear matters that simultaneously involve the provinces. We also think that the legislation
creating the Tribunal (potentially the same legislation creating the Advocate) should impose a
greater emphasis on ensuring those who adjudicate matters at the Tribunal have expertise in
the discrimination issues faced by Indigenous children and families. In general, the
qualifications of adjudicators of the Tribunal, terms of office, and further details about the
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Tribunal ought to be determined in discussion and cooperation with Indigenous groups,
including Indigenous children and youth, as mentioned earlier.
As for the powers of the Tribunal, in general, we recommend similar procedural and remedial
rules as those of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal, perhaps with some adaptation to further
facilitate effective resolution of complaints in the circumstances, including the powers to order
costs against governments.233 To ensure that the substantive equality rights of Indigenous
children and families are vindicated, we believe it would be important for the Tribunal’s power to
grant the remedial orders be mandatory where discrimination is established.234 Further, given
the importance that supervisory jurisdiction has played in the Caring Society case, the power of
the Tribunal to exercise this remedy ought to be made explicit. We also agree with the
suggestion of the Caring Society that it would be important for the Tribunal to have the power to
grant interim orders and make summary decisions in situations where there is a clear human
rights violation, or in urgent circumstances.235 The ability to incorporate Indigenous laws and
legal procedures into the process should be made explicit. It would also be desirable to design
child-informed and child-friendly procedures.236
Further advice on the design of such a Tribunal ought to be sought from those parties and other
lawyers who have been involved in the Caring Society case. The Tribunal should also be
designed to lessen the grounds upon which its decision can be reviewed.
Finally, we strongly recommend that this new Tribunal not be included within the schedule of
federal administrative tribunals falling under the Administrative Tribunals and Support Services
of Canada Act, SC 2014, c 20, s 36 (ATSSCA). The management of facilities and support
services for federal tribunals under the jurisdiction of the Administrative Tribunals Support
Services of Canada has been criticized as compromising the independence of federal tribunals,
particularly those involving Indigenous issues.237 Because the need for independence from the
federal government is crucial for the mechanisms proposed in this report, the proposed Tribunal
should not be included in the ATSSCA.

233

See Blackstock, supra note 75 at 299-300 on the need for reform in this area, as well as other further
details of access to justice problems within the current CHRT process.
234
For an example of this language, see s. 37(2) of the Human Rights Code, RSBC 1996, c 210
235
Further suggestions made by the Caring Society for consideration include a one-way cost regime as is
the case in American civil rights legislation. This might be especially important given the Supreme Court
of Canada’s decision in Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v. Canada (Attorney General),
2011 SCC 53, that powers to award costs soul be made explicit for human rights tribunals.
236
See OHCHR: Access to justice for children, supra note 164, for standards and good practices for
childrens’ access to justice; Commissioner for Children and Young People Western Australia “National
Principles for Child Safe Organizations WA: Guidelines, November 2019; Australian Government National
Office for Child Safety prepared by the New South Wales Ombudsman’s Office “Complaint Handling
Guide: Upholding the rights of children and young people” 2019; New South Wales Office of the Advocate
for Children and Young People “NSW Strategic Plan for Children and Young People – Consultation
Results Report” May 2016, and Assembly of Seven Generations, supra note 7.
237
See letter, “Independence of Specific Claims Tribunal”, to Ministers McKay and Valcourt from the
Canadian Bar Association, February 8, 2015.

70

Doing Better: Jordan’s Principle Accountability Mechanisms Report

(3) National Legal Services for Indigenous Children and Families
In addition to the Advocate and Tribunal described above, as long as federal and provincial
governments have power and control over services for Indigenous children and families, and
particularly as long as processes to access essential services remain individualized, there will
be a continued need for advocacy and legal services. Indigenous children and families require
access to knowledgeable advocates and lawyers who can support them in their attempts to
access substantive equality in services from the federal and provincial governments, and in their
interactions with child welfare systems. The power imbalance between individual children and
families and the state makes advocacy essential for upholding the right to substantive equality
and statutory human rights. These are complex areas that are challenging even for wellconnected lawyers to navigate, as the story of Carolyn Buffalo-Jackson illustrates.238 The
specialized advocacy and support the Caring Society’s staff and network of pro bono lawyers
can provide in a limited number of cases is clearly needed but needs to be regularized and
government funded on a national scale.
ISC funds Jordan Principle service coordinators from First Nations organizations to help children
and families navigate the Jordan’s Principle process. This is some recognition that Indigenous
families and children need particular support in accessing services from the federal government.
These positions are a good start because they help families navigate the process, but they are
not able to provide deeper advocacy and legal support, which is essential.
As discussed in relation to accountability need #10, Indigenous children and their families
experience significant barriers in accessing existing avenues to hold governments for violations
of their rights to services, and the Caring Society and their pro bono lawyers have been
assisting them informally on a shoe-string budget. There is a need for state-funded legal and
advocacy support to be provided to Indigenous children and families to address the
discrimination and breaches of the Canadian Human Rights Act found by the Canadian Human
Rights Tribunal and prevent further discriminatory practices in the future as well as realize their
rights to substantive equality and statutory human rights under human rights law, C92, DISA
and international human rights instruments. This should include funding supports to navigate
the different avenues for recourse, to filling forms, letter writings and speaking on their behalf, to
pursuing ombuds, child advocate, human rights challenges (before the federal or provincial
human rights commission, or the new Tribunal we are proposing) or judicial review in the courts.
The Supreme Court of Canada has held that parents living in poverty who face the prospect of
losing their children in child protection proceedings have a right to state-funding for legal
counsel.239 This is because the stress, stigma and disruption of family life caused by the
prospect of having the state take one’s child engages a parent’s right to security under s 7 of the
Charter and also violates the parent’s right to fair hearing if they do not have the opportunity to
present their case effectively. Three judges also said that because single mother’s are

See “Buffalo v Canada – My Family’s Fight for the Right for Noah to ride a bus to school,” supra note
119.
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New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), , [1999] 3 SCR 46.
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disproportionately impacted by child welfare proceedings, this also engaged equality protections
that informed a finding of a Charter violation.
Arguing from analogy, we can argue that lack of effective representation in procedures
(Jordan’s Principle requests) that may eventually result in child apprehension (and the link
between denial of services and child apprehensions in the First Nations context has been
established by the Caring Society case) violates s 7 of the Charter. Further, the MMIWG
National Inquiry Report also suggested that interjurisdictional neglect, delays and denials of
services constituted a s 7 Charter violation.240 On top of this, there is a s. 15 equality rights
dimension here given the Indigeneity of the claimants. In our view, there is a strong Charter
case for effective legal representation in Jordan Principle matters.
With respect to child welfare hearings, provincial legal aid plans in Canada can represent
parents in provincial child welfare matters, however, applying for legal aid and qualifying based
on an increasingly narrow income and other criteria, creates another barrier for many families.
Legal aid providers may not have the specialized knowledge necessary for adequate
representation, or the case may simply not meet the criteria set for legal aid (i.e. in some
provinces, legal aid can only act for a parent after apprehension of a child, so a Jordan’s
Principle appeal for medical equipment or in-home support won’t meet the threshold for
representation). In addition, Indigenous care providers and communities now have rights to
participate in child welfare hearings under C92,241 and, to our knowledge, they are likely not
covered under legal aid plans. However, without legal representation, they are likely not able to
participate meaningfully in these proceedings. Again, based on the above-noted Supreme
Court decision, there is a strong Charter argument for state-funded representation.
Furthermore, as noted earlier, the guarantees of substantive equality in the exercise of the
rights of children, their family members and communities in C92 suggest a positive obligation on
governments to fund legal representation. Where there is some overlap with provincial Legal
Aid, as noted earlier, duplication of provincial mechanisms is not a barrier and there are ways
for bodies with similar functions to cooperate with each other.
This could take different forms. Ontario has the Office of the Children’s Lawyer that is an
independent law office that operates out of the Ministry of the Attorney General.242 While such a
model has promise, in the circumstances, we believe legal services situated outside
government would be preferable. The Caring Society also recommended the Ontario Human
Rights Legal Support Center or Ontario Specialty clinics as potential structures to look at to
inspire the governance of this service.
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MMIWG Final Report, supra note 73 at 567.
An Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, supra note 98 at ss 12-

13.
Ontario Government, Office of the Children’s Lawyer, online: https://www.ontario.ca/page/officechildrens-lawyer
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A model we find particularly promising is the Legal Representation for Child and Youth (LRCY)
branch of Alberta’s Office of the Child and Youth Advocate (OCYA).243 Like other child
advocate offices, the advocate office is precluded from acting as legal counsel in their role.244 In
general, this avoids blurring lines between the investigative and persuasive functions of
advocates245 and adversarial advocacy. To avoid this blurring, but also equip children and
youth with needed legal supports, Alberta’s Child and Youth Advocate Act also gives the
advocate the power to appoint lawyers to represent children with respect to a variety of legal
matters that affect children in the province.246 Based on this, the OCYA created the LRCY. The
LRCY does not provide legal advice directly, but instead receives referrals from young people,
caseworkers, courts, parents, foster parents, other caregivers and concerned individuals,
appoints lawyers from a roster, sets and monitors service standards for lawyers, and pays
lawyers for services provided.247 For lawyers to be considered for membership on the LRCY
roster they must, be lawyers in the province in good standing, have practiced in Alberta in the
area of Family Law/Child Protection for a minimum of five years, be willing to be bound by
LRCY’s expectations and services standards, and submit a completed application and any
additional information requested by the LRCY Manager.248
We believe a similar dual model to the Advocates and the LRCY, coordinated from the
proposed Advocate, would be effective for several reasons. First, we expect the proposed
Advocate would become highly visible to Indigenous peoples, therefore having the Advocate be
a ‘one-stop-shop’ for information, complaints, and legal referrals increases accessibility.
Second, the referrals branch of the Advocate will benefit from the knowledge and expertise of
staff at the Advocate and this should inform the development of representation expectations and
standards of the Advocate, as well as development of the lawyers’ roster. Third, by building this
into the infrastructure of the proposed Advocate, this does not rely on uncoordinated provincial
legal aid offices nor requires separate legislation for the creation of a new national legal aid
entity. Building and maintaining a national roster of lawyers would create much needed capacity
and expertise for effective advocacy in these complex, under-served legal areas. Finally, the
Advocate could collect national data on common themes and regional differences in legal

Office of the Child and Youth Advocate Alberta website, “About Legal Representation for Children and
Youth,” online:https://www.ocya.alberta.ca/adult/what-we-do/legal-representation-lrcy/about-lrcy/
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Alberta’s Child and Youth Advocate Act, supra note 141 at 9(2)(c) and 11.
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The persuasive function is cooperative and flexible, which fosters consensus decision-making that
works to modify thinking and behaviour leading to long-term and widespread change, see Reif, supra
note 3 at 24, 25, 26; and Chartrand, supra note 5 at p. 17, 18, 24, 25. This function is often accompanied
by an investigative function that allows for a thorough investigation, consideration of all perspectives and
analysis of all the issues that ultimately enables a more informed and reasoned approach to
recommendations and decisions, see Reif, supra note 3 at p. 25, 49, 50. The inclusion of an adversarial
function could significantly affect the strengths of these other functions.
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See Alberta’s Child and Youth Advocate Act, supra note 141 at s 9(2)(c) and Child and Youth Advocate
Regulation, Alta Reg 53/2012, s 1.1(1).
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See “About Legal Representation for Children and Youth,” supra note 243.
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cases, which would in turn help identify inadvertent barriers, helpful solutions, educational
needs and potential subjects for systemic policy reforms.
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Recommendations
It is our conclusion that the history of overrepresentation of Indigenous children in state care,
particularly the role of interjurisdictional wrangling between the federal and provincial
governments over essential services to Indigenous children and families, which continues up to
the present (see Part 1), creates accountability needs (see Part 2) which necessitate significant
action to be taken by the government of Canada in order to create meaningful and effective
accountability.
Primary Recommendation:
We recommend three mechanisms external to the government of Canada to ensure true
accountability. We believe all three of these mechanisms must:
●

Be set out in federal legislation and not simply created by the executive, in order to
ensure independence from government and the greatest degree of oversight and
accountability. Further, the three interconnected mechanisms we proposed could be
addressed in one statute.

●

Be specific to the interest and rights of Indigenous children and families (and not
wrapped into a broader mechanism.

●

Apply to all Indigenous children and families, not just First Nations on reserve (e.g., nonstatus First Nations, off-reserve, Métis and Inuit). Such an inclusive approach prevents
repeating exclusions of the past. Instead of treating all Indigenous peoples identifically,
as a pan-Indigenous approach seeks to do, an inclusive approach, while recognizing all
Indigenous peoples are worthy of human rights protection, acknowledges there can be
differences between different sub-groups that need to be accommodated.

●

Apply to conduct of both federal and provincial governments, which Canada has the
constitutional jurisdiction to legislate pursuant to s 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The three mechanisms are:
1. A National Indigenous Children and Families Advocate, which would be based on
the thematic ombuds model of a child and youth advocate office, but also with specific
jurisdiction to oversee governments’ delivery of services to Indigenous children and
families in accordance with Jordan’s Principle, their right to substantive equality in
statutory human rights instruments and other relevant laws and international
requirements (C-92, DISA, UNDRIP, CRC, etc), as well as implementation of child
welfare legislation and policy. To be effective this Advocate should:
a. Have oversight over:
i.

Canada’s implementation of Jordan’s Principle;
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ii.

Canada’s long-term reform of child welfare, including C92
implementation;

iii.

Canada’s implementation of substantive equality in relation to all services
impacting on Indigenous Children and Families;

iv.

Federal-Provincial cooperation in servicing Indigenous Children and
Families;

v.

Education for federal and provincial government actors involved in child
welfare services;

vi.

Provincial governments’ implementation of substantive equality in relation
to all services impacting on Indigenous Children and Families; and

vii.

Child provincial welfare agencies, including their implementation of C92
(not including self-governing Indigenous Governing Bodies except with
their consent).

b. Assess governments’ obligations in relation to Jordan’s Principle and substantive
equality (protected under each government’s human rights legislation and the
Charter), C-92 and international instruments such as United Nations Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the Conventions with Rights of the Child,
and the Convention of Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
c. Scrutinizes governments’ distinctions-based approach in relation to the need for
equitable services on the grounds of the various subcategories of Indigeneity
governments have relied on in the past to make distinctions (non-status, offreserve, Metis, Inuit, etc.) as prima facie discrimination.
d. Have the power to investigate individual, group and community complaints, as
well as institute own-motion investigations, including into systemic issues.
e. Have robust investigative powers to collect and compel necessary information
from government parties to effectively respond to the different types of
complaints as well as to be able to effectively conduct systemic oversight.
f.

Conduct research and hire experts in conducting systemic inquiries.

g. Be mandated to meet with children and youth and ensure their voices are heard
in the work of the Advocate’s Office.
h. Attempt to facilitate resolution of complaints through informal and confidential
means. Such methods for resolving disputes should draw on Indigenous laws
and the dispute resolution processes where possible. This would not prevent
reporting and recommendations.
i.

Providing a “one stop shop” that can support Indigenous children, youth and their
families in navigating the different accountability mechanisms that exist. This is
not intended to limit peoples’ options for resolving complaints through other
mechanisms. It is our hope that an individual or group might start with the
Advocate to seek informal resolution or, at the least, obtain information to
navigate their options, and possibly be connected with legal support if necessary
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(we explain this further below with our third mechanism, National Legal Services
for Indigenous Children and Families).
j.

Have the power to make recommendations to governments, and to escalate
these recommendations to higher levels (up to and including the Tribunal) if
recommendations are not reasonably acted upon.

k. Report annually to Parliament on its activities, as well as make special reports
commenting on any matter within the scope of its powers that it deems
appropriate.
l.

Intervene in any adjudicative proceedings relating to the jurisdiction of the
Advocate.

m. Educate the public and federal and provincial civil servants, and those involved in
child welfare matters, about the right to substantive equality and Jordan’s
Principle, of Indigenous children and families, as well as their rights within child
welfare matters, including under C92.
n. Play a ‘knowledge mobilization’ role in terms of ensuring that standards and
practices are consistently applied/understood throughout the various jurisdiction
and country, and act as a resource for Indigenous nations and communities to
facilitate learning from each other.
o. Promote connections to culture, families, lands, waters, language, songs and
stories, as well as encourage the implementation of Indigenous laws in the work
of the Advocate.
Beyond these requirements, further details about the Advocate (composition,
qualifications, terms, staff, etc.) ought to be determined in discussion and cooperation
with Indigenous groups, including Indigenous children and youth, the Caring Society and
the pro bono lawyers who have been supporting it. We further suggest that, in the
actual development of the enabling legislation, further expert advice be sought to
recommend specific statutory language.
2. A National Indigenous Child and Family Tribunal with the power to hear complaints
(individual, group, community or systemic). To be effective, the Tribunal should:
a. Have the power to issue binding orders against both the federal and provincial
governments and their public servants and agencies.
b. Have the powers to craft its own procedures and rules of evidence that are more
flexible than the courts, including child-informed and child-friendly procedures,
and the incorporation of Indigenous law and legal procedures into the process.
c. Be mandated to issue remedial orders where discrimination is established.
d. Have extensive remedial powers, including powers to grant interim orders and
make summary decisions, as well as the power to exercise supervisory
jurisdiction made explicit.
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e. Be composed of adjudicators with expertise in the discrimination issues faced by
Indigenous children and families.
Beyond these requirements, further details about the Tribunal (composition,
qualifications, terms, staff, etc.) ought to be determined in discussion and cooperation
with Indigenous groups, including Indigenous children and youth, including parties and
lawyers that have been involved in the Caring Society case.
The creation of a Tribunal with a focus on Indigenous child and family issues is critical to
support the work of the proposed Advocate. Should Canada eventually implement
recommendations from the MMWIG National Inquiry and others to create a National
Indigenous and Human Rights Tribunal, we think this body could equally support the
work of the Advocate, so long as the Tribunal is focused only on Indigenous matters, can
bind both the provinces and governments, and has a sufficiently flexible process and
robust remedies. However, until such time as a National Indigenous and Human Rights
Tribunal, there needs to be a National Indigenous Child and Family Tribunal.
Finally, to ensure the utmost independence from the federal government, the proposed
Tribunal should not be included within the schedule of federal administrative tribunals
falling under the Administrative Tribunals and Support Services of Canada Act, SC 2014,
c 20, s 36
3. National Legal Services for Indigenous Children and Families to provide Indigenous
children and families with state-funded access to knowledgeable lawyers who can
support them in their attempts to access substantive equality in services from the federal
and provincial governments, and in their interactions with child welfare systems. The
power imbalance between individual children and families and the state makes advocacy
essential for upholding substantive equality and human rights. To be effective, these
services should:
a. Include funding support from filling forms, letter writings and speaking on their
behalf, to pursuing existing Ombuds, Child Advocate, human rights processes
(before the federal or provincial human rights commission, or the new Tribunal
we are proposing) or judicial review in the courts.
b. Take the form of a legal referral service housed in the proposed Advocate
(similar to the Legal Representation for Child and Youth branch of Alberta’s
Office of the Child and Youth Advocate). This includes:
i.

The Advocate’s Office has the power to refer children and families to
lawyers and appoint lawyers to represent them to access substantive
equality in services from the federal and provincial governments, and in
their interactions with child welfare systems.

ii.

The lawyers appointed would be from a roster maintained by the
Advocate. To get on the roster, lawyers would have to meet standards
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and expectations set by Advocate (e.g., practice experience, years at the
bar of a province, knowledge of Indigenous communities, etc.).
Additional Recommendations:
We believe all three mechanisms we have outlined can and should be legislated within one
federal statute.
This federal statute, and the details of these 3 mechanisms should be co-developed in
partnership with the AFN, the Caring Society and the Assembly of Seven Generations, and with
broad and robust consultation with Indigenous children, youth and families, knowledge holders
across all regions of Canada.
In the interim, and in addition to this external mechanism, as discussed in more detail above in
Part 3(a), we recommend the following internal steps that ISC could take immediately to
address some of the ongoing issues:

249

●

Continue and increase activities such as staff training, internal audits, dispute resolution
mechanisms and reporting,

●

Create a Code of Ethics and Network Panel249 as a framework for funding communitybased youth organizations,

●

Put in place internal human rights champions who are responsible for engaging with
service coordinators and Indigenous children, families and communities to review and
evaluate ISC processes, and advocate for changes to ensure compliance with principles
of substantive equality;

●

Review all Jordan’s Principle requests, including those with inadequate documentation,
to identify where ISC can reduce demands for documentation to a minimal data set,
particularly for services commonly approved or falling within the “normative standard of
care.’

●

Reverse the onus of who has to establish how the requested service meets the standard
of substantive equality, by requiring ISC staff to identify and give written reasons as to
where and why they believe a specific request does not fall within that standard, prior to
claimants ever being asked to explain how their request falls within this.

●

Create and use confidential release forms, that, with the consent of Indigenous children
and families, give their third party representatives access to information in order to
advocate and support clarification, claims and/or appeals; and

●

Fund the advocates or lawyers who are supporting the ad hoc advocacy work of the
Caring Society in the interim.

See Assembly of Seven Generations, supra note 7 at 6, 7, 26.
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Finally, to be clear that we are not proposing the 3 accountability mechanisms we have outlined
to be exclusive mechanisms. We do not intend that once developed, Indigenous children,
families and communities would be precluded from accessing the existing (albeit imperfect)
infrastructure that we seek to supplement. Given the history of systemic discrimination against
Indigenous children and families discussed in Part 1, we feel strongly that Indigenous children
and families should have more avenues for vindicating their rights to substantive equality, not
less. Accordingly, along with our recommendations above, we encourage Canada, in the
enabling legislation to create the mechanisms below, to include the following provisions in order
improve access to existing mechanisms:
●

A provision giving courts hearing matters touching on Jordan’s Principle or the
substantive equality rights of Indigenous children and familes, the ability to address such
discrimination. For example, section 46.1 of the Ontario Human Rights Code contains
such a provision.250

●

Even leaving aside the jurisdictional issues in judicially reviewing Jordan’s Principle
claims in Part 3(e) above, there remain several challenges for Indigenous children and
families to bring successful judicial review proceedings in the courts. One challenge is
lack of clear legislated references standards courts can use to review governments’
interactions with Indigenous children.251 While DISA and C92 now provide reference
standards to applicable to some decision-makers, given the gravity of discrimination
against First Nations’ children in Caring Society v. Canada, a more universal standard,
applicable to all decision-makers may be called for. This could be effectuated through a
clause in the proposed legislation stating: “The best interests of the child must be the
paramount consideration in all decisions impacting Indigenous children. The unique
cultural, historical, and geographic strengths, needs and circumstances must be
considered as part of the best interests of the child.”

●

To avoid closing any legal doors for potential complainants, including to existing human
rights commission and tribunals, it would be important to include a specific provision to
neutralize provisions commonly found in human rights statutes requiring the
complainants to exhaust alternative grievances or review procedures reasonably
available.252 This provision could read as follows “Nothing in this Act shall be construed
so as to abrogate or derogate from the rights provided for under the Canadian Human
Rights Act, any provincial human rights statute or provincial child advocate or ombuds
state.” A similar provision appears in the Canada Labour Code.253
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Human Rights Code, RSO 1990, c H.19, s. 46.1.
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Conclusion
In identifying the accountability problems to be addressed by an accountability mechanism for
this report, we have looked thoroughly at the context of a “one of the worst possible cases” of
racial discrimination, that has deeply and irrevocably harmed multiple generations of Indigenous
children and families. We have also reviewed features of effective accountability mechanisms
that can contribute to the imperative work of bringing an end to these ongoing harms.
There has been progress, and genuine work toward internal, policy and even legislative reform.
However, there is much work to be done and many of the reforms that Canada has unilaterally
implemented have been inadequate to stymy ongoing substantive equality and statutory human
rights violations. The vast majority of meaningful reforms to date have occurred since the
Tribunal issued its 2016 Main Decision and retained supervisory jurisdiction.
There will come a day, when the Tribunal will relinquish jurisdiction over the case. Given the
very long history of systemic discrimination against Indigenous people by the government in
Canada, particularly in the area of service delivery, it will be important to have alternative
accountability mechanisms in place. We have set out 3 that, together, we believe will practically
address the accountability problems that have facilitated one of the worst possible cases of
racial discrimination in Canadian history for over half a century. There are also internal steps
ISC can take in the interim, and in addition, to external legislated accountability mechanisms.
The Assembly of Seven Generations report clearly emphasized that “Indigenous youth and
children deserve accountability and responsibility from the federal government, as well as all
levels of government.” As Cindy Blackstock says, once we know better, we need to do better.
We hope and believe a new and better chapter has begun and can be created for present and
future generations. Accountability is an essential aspect of this. Indigenous children, youth and
families deserve nothing less.
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